THE NEED FOR A RESEARCH CULTURE IN THE FORENSIC SCIENCES by Koehler, Jonathan et al.
Northwestern University School of Law
Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons
Faculty Working Papers
2011
THE NEED FOR A RESEARCH CULTURE IN
THE FORENSIC SCIENCES
Jonathan Koehler
Northwestern University School of Law, jay.koehler@northwestern.edu
Jennifer L. Mnookin




See next page for additional authors
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Working Papers by an authorized administrator of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Repository Citation
Koehler, Jonathan; Mnookin, Jennifer L.; Cole, Simon A.; Fisher, Barry A.J.; Dror, Itiel E.; Houck, Max; Inman, Kieth; Kaye, David H.;
Langenburg, Glenn; Risinger, D. Michel; Rudin, Norah; and Siegel, Jay, "THE NEED FOR A RESEARCH CULTURE IN THE
FORENSIC SCIENCES" (2011). Faculty Working Papers. Paper 26.
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/facultyworkingpapers/26
Authors
Jonathan Koehler, Jennifer L. Mnookin, Simon A. Cole, Barry A.J. Fisher, Itiel E. Dror, Max Houck, Kieth
Inman, David H. Kaye, Glenn Langenburg, D. Michel Risinger, Norah Rudin, and Jay Siegel





58:3 Mnookin et al Mnookin Final Proof 1 (1/12/2011 3:41:00 PM) 
                                                                                                                           
 





 Simon A. Cole, Itiel E. Dror,  
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Norah Rudin, Jay Siegel, and David A. Stoney 
The methods, techniques, and reliability of the forensic sciences in general, 
and the pattern identification disciplines in particular, have faced significant 
scrutiny in recent years.  Critics have attacked the scientific basis for the 
assumptions and claims made by forensic scientists both in and out of the 
courtroom.  Defenders have emphasized courts’ long-standing acceptance of 
forensic science evidence, the relative dearth of known errors, and the skill and 
experience of practitioners.  This Article reflects an effort made by a diverse 
group of participants in these debates, including law professors, academics from 
several disciplines, and practicing forensic scientists, to find and explore common 
ground.  To what extent do the forensic sciences need to change in order to place 
themselves on an appropriately secure foundation in the 21st century?  We all 
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firmly agree that the traditional forensic sciences in general, and the pattern 
identification disciplines, such as fingerprint, firearm, tool mark and handwriting 
identification evidence in particular, do not currently possess—and absolutely 
must develop—a well-established scientific foundation.  This can only be 
accomplished through the development of a research culture that permeates the 
entire field of forensic science.  A research culture, we argue, must be grounded 
in the values of empiricism, transparency, and a commitment to an ongoing 
critical perspective.  The forensic science disciplines need to substantially increase 
their commitment to evidence from empirical research as the basis for their 
conclusions.  Sound research, rather than experience, training, and longstanding 
use, must become the central method by which assertions are justified.  In this 
Article, we describe the underdeveloped research culture in the non-DNA 
forensic sciences, offer suggestions for how it might be improved, and explain 
why it matters. 
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Long-used types of forensic science—fingerprint examination, 
handwriting analysis, firearms and toolmark comparison, and other forms of 
pattern and impression evidence—are mainstays of criminal prosecution.  
For roughly a hundred years, these comparison and identification methods 
have regularly and routinely been employed as legal evidence.  For most of 
that period, courts, attorneys, jurors, and the public, as well as forensic 
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analysts themselves, have largely accepted this evidence as trustworthy and 
uncontroversial. 
In the last few years, the situation has changed dramatically.  These 
methods and techniques now face more criticism and scrutiny than ever 
before.  Latent fingerprint identification,1 questioned document 
examination, and firearms comparison have been the targets of numerous 
admissibility challenges.  Defendants have argued that this evidence is 
insufficiently valid to be admissible under Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,2 and insufficiently accepted by the relevant scientific 
community to be admissible under Frye v. United States.3  While most courts 
have continued to admit these forms of evidence, forensic practitioners 
have found themselves in the spotlight, forced to justify and defend 
practices that had previously evaded scrutiny.4  Meanwhile, scandals 
 
 1. A latent fingerprint is an impression left by a finger (or, more precisely, by friction 
ridge skin) on a surface.  Latent prints are commonly recovered from crime scenes. 
 2. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).  The Court, in an opinion by Justice Blackmun, held that the 
Federal Rules of Evidence required judges confronted with a challenge to scientific evidence to 
engage in a “flexible” inquiry whose “overarching subject is the scientific validity—and thus the 
evidentiary relevance and reliability—of the principles that underlie a proposed submission.”  Id. 
at 594–95.  The Court elaborated on Daubert’s approach in General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 
136 (1997), which reaffirmed the Court’s commitment to trial court gatekeeping and made clear 
that the appellate standard for review of the trial court’s admissibility decisions was abuse of 
discretion.  In Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, the Court held that the district court’s gatekeeping 
obligations extended to all forms of expert evidence and that judicial evaluation of reliability of 
expert evidence should focus on the particular task at issue in the specific case rather than the 
general validity of a field of expertise writ large.  526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999). 
 3. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).  Frye’s key and oft-quoted language states: 
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental 
and demonstrable stages is difficult to define.  Somewhere in this twilight zone the 
evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way 
in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or 
discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to 
have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs. 
Id. at 1014 (emphasis added).  With any given forensic science, if the particular field, such as 
firearms comparison, is defined narrowly to consist only of firearms examiners, general acceptance 
cannot be in doubt.  If the field is defined more broadly to include experts in all forms of pattern 
analysis, statisticians, and computer scientists, then the answer becomes less obvious.  See, e.g., 1 
DANIEL L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT 
TESTIMONY § 1:5, at 12–13 (2009–2010 ed.); DAVID H. KAYE, DAVID BERNSTEIN & JENNIFER L. 
MNOOKIN: THE NEW WIGMORE: EXPERT EVIDENCE § 6.3.3(b) (2d ed. forthcoming 2010); Simon 
A. Cole, Out of the Daubert Fire and Into the Fryeing Pan? Self-Validation, Meta-Expertise and the 
Admissibility of Latent Print Evidence in Frye Jurisdictions, 9 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 453 (2008).  
In addition, many Frye states have inched towards a partial inquiry into validity.  See 1 PAUL C. 
GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELREID, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 1.11, at 67 (2007); KAYE, 
BERNSTEIN & MNOOKIN, supra, § 7.4.2(b). 
 4. For a recent look at the variety of judicial reactions to these forms of evidence, see 
generally, KAYE, BERNSTEIN & MNOOKIN, supra note 3, § 15 (collecting cases); Jennifer L. 
Mnookin, The Courts, the NAS, and the Future of Forensic Science, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 
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involving crime laboratories have rippled across the nation: from Los 
Angeles to Charlotte, from Oklahoma City to Houston, stories of 
carelessness, bias, incompetence, excessive coziness with prosecutors, and 
other embarrassing revelations have raised doubts about the trustworthiness 
and accuracy of some reported findings in a disturbing number of 
laboratories.5  In 2004, the American fingerprint community faced its most 
public fingerprint error ever when several highly experienced FBI examiners 
erroneously linked Oregon attorney (and Muslim convert) Brandon 
Mayfield to a fingerprint associated with the Madrid train bombing.6  One 
 
(forthcoming 2010).  Handwriting evidence has received a more ambivalent reception than 
fingerprint identification or firearms comparison.  See D. Michael Risinger, Cases Involving the 
Reliability of Handwriting Identification Expertise Since the Decision in Daubert, 43 TULSA L. REV. 477 
(2007). 
 5. Over the last twenty years, serious concerns have arisen in crime laboratories across the 
country, including in Boston, Chicago, Detroit, Houston, Los Angeles, New York, North 
Carolina, Oklahoma, San Francisco, and West Virginia, as well as at the FBI laboratory.  KAYE, 
BERNSTEIN & MNOOKIN, supra note 3, § 1.4.1(a).  For examples from the voluminous press on 
these scandals, see JOHN F. KELLY & PHILLIP K. WEARNE, TAINTING EVIDENCE: INSIDE THE 
SCANDALS AT THE FBI CRIME LAB (1998); Tina Daunt, LAPD Blames Faulty Training in DNA 
Snafu, L.A. TIMES, July 31, 2002 (discussing the LAPD’s accidental destruction of rape kits); 
Lianne Hart, DNA Lab’s Woes Cast Doubt on 68 Prison Terms, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2003 
(discussing the Houston crime lab scandal); Mandy Locke & Joseph Neff, Inspectors Failed to Find 
SBI Faults, CHARLOTTES OBSERVER, Aug. 26, 2010; Moises Mendoza, HPD Fingerprinting Trouble 
Not Unique, HOUSTON CHRON., Dec. 13 2009 (giving context to Houston fingerprint lab 
problems); Steve Mills & Maurice Possley, Report Alleges Crime Lab Fraud: Scientist Is Accused of 
Providing False Testimony, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 14, 2001 (discussing the Pamela Fish scandal in 
Chicago); Maggie Mulvihill & Franci Richardson, Unfit Cops Put in Key Evidence Unit; Fingerprint 
Handlers Were All Thumbs, BOSTON HERALD, May 7, 2004; Maurice Possley, Steve Mills & Flynn 
McRoberts, Scandal Touches Even Elite Labs: Flawed Work, Resistance to Scrutiny Seen Across U.S., 
CHI. TRIB., Oct. 21, 2004; Jonathan Saltzman & John R. Ellement, Mass. DNA Lab’s Lapses Draw 
Beacon Hill Inquiry: Delays, Errors Laid to Lack of Oversight, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 17, 2007 
(discussing the Massachusetts state crime lab scandal); Ben Schmitt & Joe Swickard, Troubled 
Detroit Police Crime Lab Shuttered: State Police Audit Results ‘Appalling,’ Wayne County Prosecutor 
Declares, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Sept. 26, 2008 (discussing the multiple problems that led to the 
Detroit crime lab’s closure); Jaxon Van Derbeken, SFPD Drug-Test Technician Accused of 
Skimming, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 10, 2010 (discussing the San Francisco crime lab scandal); Murray 
Weiss, Criminal Errors, N.Y. POST, Dec. 4, 2007 (discussing a scandal at an NYPD crime lab); Jim 
Yardley, Inquiry Focuses on Scientist Employed by Prosecutors, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2001 (discussing 
the Joyce Gilchrist Oklahoma scandal); Court Invalidates a Decade of Blood Test Results in Criminal 
Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1993 (discussing the Fred Zain West Virginia scandal).  The 
problems that have come to light have occurred in a variety of forensic areas, including serology, 
bloodstain pattern analysis, DNA, fingerprint identification and others.  While our primary focus 
in this Article is on pattern evidence, these scandals serve as a reminder that the issues we 
describe warrant thoughtful attention throughout forensic science, not just in the pattern 
identification arena. 
 6. See Robert B. Stacey, Report on the Erroneous Fingerprint Individualization in the Madrid 
Train Bombing Case, 54 J FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 706 (2004); OVERSIGHT AND REVIEW DIV., 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE FBI’S HANDLING OF THE BRANDON MAYFIELD CASE 
(2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0601/PDF_list.htm. 
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study found that the trials of more than half of those defendants exonerated 
by post-conviction DNA testing included forensic evidence offered by the 
prosecution.7  A follow-up study examining the underlying transcripts 
concluded that the testimony presented by forensic analysts had frequently 
been overstated or misleading.8  While currently available information does 
not permit quantification beyond the sample of case examined, these 
studies do suggest that misleading or erroneous forensic science has 
contributed to a substantial number of false convictions.  A number of 
academics began to examine the research foundation of some long-used 
forensic disciplines and found that frequently made claims were supported 
by far less rigorous research than might have been expected.  And in 
February 2009, the prestigious National Academy of Sciences (NAS) issued 
a long-awaited report on the forensic sciences that concluded: “With the 
exception of DNA analysis, . . . no forensic method has been rigorously 
shown to have the capacity to consistently, and with a high degree of 
certainty, demonstrate a connection between evidence and a specific 
individual or source.”9 
The NAS Report suggested a number of major improvements for 
forensic science.  Most significantly, it called for the creation of an entirely 
new, independent federal agency to oversee and regulate the practices of 
forensic science, and to ensure the development of rigorous research to 
 
 7. Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 82 (2008). 
 8. See Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and 
Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1 (2009).  There are three important caveats to be made 
regarding this article’s conclusions.  First, the single most problematic form of evidence in the 
Garrett & Neufeld study was microscopic hair analysis, which is now typically used as an adjunct 
to mitochondrial DNA assessment of hair.  Some have therefore argued that this makes the 
study’s conclusions largely moot.  See, e.g., JOHN COLLINS & JAY JARVIS, CRIME LAB REPORT, 
THE WRONGFUL CONVICTION OF FORENSIC SCIENCE (2008), available at 
http://www.crimelabreport.com/library/pdf/wrongful_conviction.pdf.  However, there is no reason 
to believe that the culture that produced these frequent overstatements and failures to adhere 
strictly to conclusions warranted by the evidence was limited to microscopic hair analysis.  
Second, it is important to recognize that some of the expert testimony was not erroneous or 
overstated, even if it turned out to invite an incorrect inference about the identity of the 
perpetrator.  See, e.g., COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCIS. CMTY., NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH 
FORWARD 120 (2009) [hereinafter NAS REPORT] (pointing out that evidence such as physical 
inspection of hair or paint that merely identifies a trace as falling into a large class of potential 
sources is accurate even if it turns out that the defendant is not the source).  Third, of course, we 
have virtually no direct information in these cases about how the jury perceived the forensic 
science evidence.  It would therefore be dangerous to infer from the mere fact of conviction that 
the jury found the forensic science evidence either persuasive or critical in any given case; 
however, it would be equally questionable to presume that it did not.  The prosecution proffered 
it, after all, to aid in conviction. 
 9. NAS REPORT, supra note 8, at 7. 
6 DRAFT: Do not cite 
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determine the capabilities and the limits of forensic science.10  This 
combination of events—legal challenges, laboratory scandals, widely 
publicized errors, skeptical scholarship, and a highly critical national 
report—has focused sometimes unwelcome but badly needed attention on 
the forensic sciences.  These developments offer the opportunity for 
reflection and improvement. 
Now, roughly two years after the publication of this major report, 
where do the pattern and impression disciplines and the forensic sciences 
more generally stand?11  What are the ongoing problems in these fields?  
What ought to be the intellectually significant and yet practically realizable 
goals for improving forensic science evidence over the next decade or two?  
The purpose of this Article is to describe what we think forensic science 
most needs in order to best serve justice, the legal system, the public, and its 
own practitioners.  Our central argument is that the pattern identification 
disciplines, and forensic science more generally, do not currently possess—
and absolutely must develop—an adequate research culture.  In what 
follows, we will outline the essential elements of a research culture; provide 
examples to support our claim that within these disciplines such a culture is 
weak or faltering; and offer some concrete suggestions for how a research 
culture might be created. 
The authors of this essay are a diverse group.  This group includes 
those who are quite regularly labeled critics of forensic science, as well as 
defenders, including some who toil in the fields of forensic science every 
day.  It includes forensic analysts from several fields who regularly appear in 
court testifying to the reliability of forensic evidence, as well as those who 
have appeared in court criticizing such evidence.  Some of us are pursuing 
empirical research about forensic science; others write more conceptually 
 
 10. Id. 
 11. Our primary focus is on pattern and impression evidence.  These disciplines include 
fingerprint analysis, firearms and toolmark comparison, questioned document examination, 
shoeprint examination, microscopic hair comparison, tire tread comparison, blood spatter analysis, 
bite mark analysis, and other physical object comparisons.  These disciplines have in common 
that they attempt to determine whether or not a particular pattern or impression—be it a 
shoeprint, a tire tread, a fingerprint, or a bullet—can be associated with a particular source.  
(Blood spatter analysis is an exception, as it attempts to use the pattern of blood to infer 
something about the physical events that gave rise to them).  Although we focus primarily on 
pattern evidence, many of our arguments apply to forensic science more broadly.  Tracing out with 
specificity where they do and do not fully apply across the broader range of forensic sciences—
from DNA analysis to arson investigation to toxicology—is beyond the scope of this Article.  We 
recognize that different portions of the forensic science landscape vary in the extent to which they 
already possess a robust research culture, but we believe that the forensic science enterprise, as a 
whole, would benefit from more focused efforts to develop the outlook and practices referred to in 
this Article as a research culture. 
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about its strengths and limitations; still others among us spend more time 
practicing forensic science than writing about it.  One of us is a former 
director of a major crime laboratory.  The academics in this group come 
from multiple fields and varying disciplinary backgrounds, including law, 
cognitive psychology, chemistry, molecular biology, forensic science, and 
the sociology of science.  One member of the group was on the NAS 
committee and helped write its report. 
Given the breadth of backgrounds, disciplines, and points of view, and 
given the current controversies surrounding forensic science, it will come as 
no surprise that this diverse group of authors does not agree about 
everything.  We cannot pretend to share a wholly unified vision for the 
future of forensic science.  But what is striking—and what generated this 
Article—is that there is a good deal about which we do agree.  The purpose 
of this Article is to focus on these substantial areas of agreement.  We aim 
to lay out our shared understanding of some of the current problems in 
forensic science, and our consensus on how to improve the pattern 
identification fields, and the rest of the forensic science enterprise, so that 
they will rest on an appropriately secure foundation as they continue to 
provide valuable evidence into the twenty-first century. 
Significantly, despite our diverse backgrounds and points of view, we 
agree on many aspects of both the diagnosis of current difficulties and a 
direction for a cure.  In our collective opinion, the pattern identification 
disciplines, as well as other forms of forensic science evidence, must be 
placed on a more rigorous scientific foundation.  More generally, we believe 
that a significant culture shift is required: Forensic science needs to focus 
more on science than on law, to shift from a quasi-adversarial perspective to 
a research orientation.  In short, we call for the development and 
instantiation of what we will term a research culture within forensic science.  
The emergence of a research culture would affect how evidence is 
understood, change analysts’ relationship to empirical data, and alter how 
evidence is reported.  We do not delude ourselves that change comes easily 
or that a culture shift alone will immediately ensure that all forensic 
analyses are well founded.12  But we believe that this transition is both 
necessary and, while difficult, genuinely feasible. 
 
 12. To be sure, scientists steeped in the research culture we describe in this Article also 
sometimes make claims that outstrip their data or promote methods before the application has 
been shown to be fully robust or before all its limitations are clear.  See, e.g., DAVID H. KAYE, THE 
DOUBLE HELIX AND THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 51–53 (2010) (describing the early claims of the 
developer of DNA fingerprinting).  Nevertheless, in a competitive research culture, any premature 
enthusiasm or dubious assertions are likely to be met with criticism from others in the community, 
8 DRAFT: Do not cite 
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In what follows, we begin with a brief overview of the NAS Report, a 
watershed publication for the assessment of the current state of the forensic 
sciences.  We use this report as a springboard to describe our consensus 
about what the forensic sciences need most in order to attain a solid footing 
over the next decades: to wit, the creation of a robust research culture, in 
which empirical evidence and careful scrutiny regarding the evidentiary 
warrant for whatever claims are made become part of the ordinary way of 
thinking about forensic practices.  In Part II, we describe what we see as the 
critical components of a research culture, including a focus on empirical 
evidence, transparency, and a consistently critical and reflective perspective 
on claims of knowledge.  In Part III, we provide a number of examples and 
illustrations to show why we do not believe that the research culture within 
forensic sciences, and within pattern and impression evidence in particular, 
is presently either well developed or robust.  In the final Part, we offer a 
variety of suggestions, some of them familiar and some of them more 
innovative, for creating and fostering a research culture for forensic science. 
I. THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES REPORT 
In February 2009, The National Academy of Sciences issued its major 
report on forensic science.13  Congress commissioned the report late in 2005 
at the behest of the forensic science community itself.  The Academy 
appointed a panel of judges, scholars, and forensic and legal practitioners to 
write the report.  This committee heard more than sixteen days of 
testimony—more than eighty witnesses in eight meetings over a two-year 
period—from a variety of leading forensic scientists and academic 
researchers.14 
In addition to the major recommendation to create a National 
Institute of Forensic Science (NIFS), the committee put forward two other 
 
leading in the long run to a much more secure foundation for the applications of the theory or 
procedure.  See id. at 53–54, 117, 119–20, 123–26, 138 (describing how the scientists who 
promoted or defended DNA identification responded to various published criticisms); see also 
Jennifer L. Mnookin, People v. Castro: Challenging the Forensic Use of DNA Evidence, in EVIDENCE 
STORIES 207 (Richard Lempert ed., 2006).  See generally D. Michael Risinger, The Irrelevance, and 
Central Relevance, of the Boundary Between Science and Non-Science in the Evaluation of Expert 
Witness Reliability, 52 VILL. L. REV. 679, 700–12 (2007). 
 13. NAS REPORT, supra note 8. 
 14. Harry T. Edwards, Co-Chair, Committee On Identifying the Needs of the Forensic 
Science Community, The National Academy of Sciences Report on Forensic Sciences: What It 
Means for the Bench and Bar (May 6, 2010).  For a close look at the committee and who was on 
it, see D. Michael Risinger, The NAS/NRC Report on Forensic Science: A Path Forward Fraught with 
Pitfalls, 2010 UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming). 
A Research Culture for the Forensic Sciences 9 
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important structural recommendations: the removal of public forensic 
science laboratories from administrative control of law enforcement 
agencies or prosecutor’s offices;15 and the gradual abolition of state and local 
coroner’s offices in favor of a medical examiner system.16  Given the 
committee’s key finding that an inadequate research basis existed for claims 
often made in forensic science, most of the recommendations were 
concerned with improving the science in forensic science.  Specific 
recommendations included calls for: 
(1) Foundational research that would assess the validity and 
reliability of methods used in the analysis of evidence, 
especially pattern evidence.17 
(2) Further research into the issues of cognitive bias and its 
effects on forensic decisionmaking.  The committee 
recognized the significant need to investigate when 
contextual or confirmational bias might affect examiner’s 
processes or their conclusions, and the need both to study its 
extent and to develop countermeasures.18 
(3) Standardization of laboratory reports and a standard 
definition of terms, especially those expressing the 
association between an item of evidence and a possible 
source.19 
(4) Mandatory accreditation of all forensic science laboratories 
that process evidence for court and mandatory certification 
of all forensic scientists who analyze evidence.20 
(5) A mandatory code of ethics that is tied to certification and 
makes possible the removal of serious ethical violators from 
the practice of forensic science.21 
The NAS Committee was not charged specifically with examining the 
issues surrounding pattern and impression evidence, although the final 
report does emphasize these areas.  This focus emerged as the committee 
heard testimony about the present state of research and the validity and 
reliability of forensic science methods.  In testimony presented, various 
 
 15. NAS REPORT, supra note 8, at 23–24. 
 16. Id. at 29. 
 17. Id. at 22–23. 
 18. Id. at 24. 
 19. Id. at 21. 
 20. Id. at 25. 
 21. Id. at 26. 
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types of pattern evidence were cited as poster children for the lack of 
scientific foundation in forensic science and the need for more research to 
establish the validity (or lack of it) in forensic science’s analytical 
methods.22  Fairly or not, the report reflects this emphasis, and in this 
Article, we too focus primarily on the pattern and impression areas.  
Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that the pattern evidence areas 
are not alone in generating the concerns expressed in the NAS Report or in 
this Article.  Every area of forensic science, including DNA typing, 
described by the NAS Committee as the “gold standard” of forensic science, 
suffers to some degree from the problems the Report ascribed to pattern 
evidence.  Most of the recommendations in the NAS Report are global in 
their reach; they are intended to apply to forensic science as a whole.  
Similarly, although we focus on pattern and impression evidence processed 
by human analysts using visual examination, many of our arguments apply 
beyond these domains.  At the same time, we recognize that forensic 
science culture is not monolithic or unitary.  We hope that our remarks in 
the context of pattern and impression evidence will encourage further 
discussion and attention to the question of how to create, develop, or 
improve the research culture in other areas, including forensic chemistry, 
DNA analysis, fire investigation, and medicolegal death investigation. 
We all agree that publication of the Report was a watershed moment 
for the forensic sciences.  The Report continues to generate both attention 
and controversy.  Already it has prompted, or at least spurred, some degree 
of change in forensic science practice.23  It continues to influence practicing 
forensic scientists themselves, as well as those who interact with forensic 
disciplines, including lawyers and judges, government officials, and 
government regulatory and funding entities such as the National Institute 
of Justice (NIJ), National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), 
and the National Science Foundation (NSF).24 
 
 22. Chapter five of the NAS Report discusses and offers summary assessments of, for 
example, biological evidence, analysis of controlled substances, friction ridge analysis, shoeprints 
and tire tracks, toolmark and firearms identification, hair and fiber evidence, questioned 
document examination, paint and coating evidence, arson and explosives evidence, bitemark 
analysis, and bloodstain pattern analysis.  See id. at 127–83.  Chapter nine focuses entirely on 
medicolegal death analysis.  See id. at 241–68. 
 23. See, e.g., IAI Resolution 2010–18 (July 16, 2010) (reflecting a “change [in] the official 
position of the Association related to Friction Ridge Examinations based on advances in the 
science and scientific research”). 
 24. The National Science Foundation recently funded a workshop at Northwestern Law 
School called “Cognitive Bias and Forensic Science” largely designed to encourage social and 
cognitive psychologists to conduct empirical studies to improve our understanding of factors that 
affect forensic science judgments and decisions.  Similarly, the National Institute of Justice has 
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We also agree with much of the content of the Report.25  Perhaps most 
significantly, we agree with the National Academy’s central and important 
conclusion that the traditional forensic sciences are, at this point, 
inadequately supported by empirical data that would justify the strong 
claims analysts frequently make.  We believe that numerous assertions made 
both in routine practice and in court are neither backed up by sufficient 
empirical data or research, nor are the kinds of claims that can be justified 
or validated simply by reference to longstanding experience.26  We have in 
mind, for example, asserting an error rate of zero for the methodology of 
latent fingerprint identification; testifying that forensic practitioners have 
an adequate empirical and experiential basis for confidently determining in 
run-of-the-mill cases that two prints—or shoe marks or firearms or 
exemplars of handwriting—share a common source to the exclusion of all 
other possible sources;27 claiming confidence based on experience that 
 
solicited research proposals from social scientists to study, for example, “‘context bias’ and the 
need for a greater understanding of the scope of this issue in forensic laboratories.”  NAT’L INST. 
OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SOLICITATION: SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH IN FORENSIC 
SCIENCE 3 (2010). 
 25. One author of this Article served on the NAS committee, and several others gave 
invited presentations to the committee.  Nonetheless, we do not agree with every sentence or 
every detail of every argument in this report.  Certainly we each have both nits to pick as well as 
admiration for its strengths; indeed several of us have already expressed both our criticism and our 
praise in print.  See, e.g., Simon A. Cole, Who Speaks for Science? A Response to the National 
Academy of Sciences Report on Forensic Science, 9 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 25 (2010); Itiel E. 
Dror, How Can Francis Bacon Help Forensic Science? The Four Idols of Human Biases, 50 
JURIMETRICS J. 93 (2009); David H. Kaye, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: The NRC Report on 
Strengthening Forensic Science in America, 50 SCI. & JUST. 8 (2010); Jonathan J. Koehler, Forensic 
Science Reform in the 21st Century: A Major Conference, a Blockbuster Report and Reasons to Be 
Pessimistic, 9 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 1 (2010); Mnookin, supra note 4; D. Michael Risinger, 
The NAS/NRC Report on Forensic Science: A Glass Nine-Tenths Full (This Is About the Other 
Tenth), 50 JURIMETRICS J. 21 (2009); Risinger, supra note 14.  For a collection of responses from 
the forensic science community, see id. at ___. 
 26. See, e.g., Mark A. Acree, What Is Science? The Dilemma of Fingerprint Science Revisited, 
14 PRINT 4 (1998); Michelle Reznicek et al., ACE-V and the Scientific Method, 60 J. FORENSIC 
IDENTIFICATION 87 (2010); Michele Triplett & Lauren Cooney, The Etiology of ACE-V and Its 
Proper Use: An Exploration of the Relationship Between ACE-V and the Scientific Method of Hypothesis 
Testing, 56 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 345 (2006); Norah Rudin & Keith Inman, The 
Experience Fallacy, CACNEWS, Fourth Quarter 2010, at 10, available at 
http://cacnews.org/news/4thq10.pdf. 
 27. There may be rare instances when the strong claim of individualization could be 
warranted because both sides agree that the universe of potential suspects is small—such as, for 
example, in a situation where it is uncontested that a murder was committed by one of a small 
group of people in a locked house.  But this inference is warranted in these circumstances because 
of the reduced size of the possible suspect population, not because of the prints’ power to 
individualize to the exclusion of all others in the universe.  See KAYE, BERNSTEIN & MNOOKIN, 
supra note 3, § 15.2; David H. Kaye, Probability, Individualization, and Uniqueness in Forensic 
Evidence: Listening to the Academics, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1163, 1174–75 (2010) (arguing that 
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analysts have taken adequate steps to counter the effects of bias and 
context; or averring that the techniques used by forensic pattern disciplines 
follow “the scientific method.”28 
We do recognize that experience, training, and longstanding 
investigatory and legal use can be sources of legitimate knowledge for 
pattern identification analysts.  We also recognize that experience and 
training can give examiners, from a subjective point of view, sincere and 
deeply held confidence about their ability to do what they claim to do.  But 
we do not believe that experience and training alone can validate 
universalist claims, such as the claim that latent fingerprint identification 
experts can individualize the source of a print to the exclusion of all other 
possibilities,29 or the claim that document examiners’ experience enables 
them to assess the entire range of differences between two handwriting 
exemplars that can still be consistent with authorship by the same hand.30 
 
testing most, but not all, of a closed set of suspects can justify the conclusion that the trace 
evidence originated from a single individual). 
 28. To some extent, these specific rhetorical claims are being modified in the aftermath of, 
and in response to, the Report.  Indeed, the day after the Report was issued, the president of the 
International Association of Identification (IAI) wrote the membership: “It is suggested that 
members not assert 100% infallibility (zero error rate) when addressing the reliability of 
fingerprint comparisons.”  Memorandum From Robert Garrett, President, Int’l Ass’n for 
Identification, to the Membership of Int’l Ass’n for Identification (Feb. 19, 2009), available at 
http://www.theiai.org/current_affairs/nas_memo_20090219.pdf.  In July, 2010, the IAI also 
opened the door to probabilistic testimony regarding the likelihood of a fingerprint match, and 
rescinded a 1979 resolution that limited such testimony to only three possible conclusions: 
individualization, exclusion, and unknown.  For the recent resolution, see IAI Resolution 2010–
18, supra note 23.  In the summer of 2010, the chairman of the Scientific Working Group on 
Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology (SWGFAST), a standard-setting organization for 
friction ridge analysis, issued a “clarification” asserting that the phrase “to the exclusion of all 
others” is likely to be removed from its Friction Ridge Examination Methodology materials.  
Letter From Leonard G. Butt, Chairman, Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, 
Study, and Tech., to Whom It May Concern (June 29, 2010), available at 
http://www.swgfast.org/Comments-Positions/SWGFAST_NAS_Position_Clarification.doc.  
While we believe that all of these terminological shifts are positive developments, they do not 
negate or eliminate our more general arguments about the continued lack of a research culture in 
much of the pattern identification sciences, nor do they solve the problem of how to responsibly 
characterize the probative value of the results of an analysis.  On this latter difficulty, see generally 
KAYE, BERNSTEIN & MNOOKIN, supra note 3, § 15; Mnookin, supra note 4. 
 29. For discussion of the dubious underpinnings of assertions of “global individualization,” 
see KAYE, BERNSTEIN & MNOOKIN, supra note 3. 
 30. See, e.g., What Is Forensic Document Examination?: Handwriting Examination, SE. ASS’N 
OF FORENSIC DOCUMENT EXAMINERS, http://www.safde.org/whatwedo.htm (last visited Dec. 26, 
2010): 
Handwriting identification is based on the principle that, while handwriting within 
a language tends to be alike to the degree that we can meaningfully read it, there are 
individual features that distinguish one person’s writing from that of another.  Just as no 
two people are exactly alike, the handwritings of no two people are exactly alike in their 
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More generally, we believe that not enough is yet known about a 
significant range of important questions.  Consider, for example, the 
following: Precisely what are the capabilities and limitations of any 
particular pattern discipline?  How often do pattern identification analysts 
make mistakes?  When these errors occur, what causes them?  How should 
error be defined,31 and what circumstances tend to increase the risk of error?  
How prevalent is the effect of cognitive bias on the activity of forensic 
examiners?  When might access to contextual information affect forensic 
examiners’ cognitive processes, or even their final determinations?  How 
frequently might a portion of two fingerprints—or striation marks on 
bullets, or toolmarks, or handwriting specimens—share any given degree of 
similarity even if they derive from different sources?  How does the use of 
large databases or new imaging technologies help these disciplines, and 
what dangers may new technologies pose?  Just how much visual 
information is sufficient to undertake an accurate analysis of a handwriting 
specimen, a latent fingerprint, or a firearm?  To what extent does training 
improve examiner accuracy?  What kind of training is most effective? 
The honest response to all of these questions is that we do not yet 
know.  Suggestive research is emerging in some of these areas, including 
contributions from several co-authors of this Article.32  But we all agree that 
 
combination of characteristics.  There are, of course, natural variations within the 
handwriting of each individual.  These variations must be closely and carefully studied by 
the examiner, so that he can distinguish between what is a “variation” and what is a 
“difference.” 
The examiner must also be cognizant of the differences between “class 
characteristics” and “individual characteristics.”  Class characteristics are those which are 
common to a group such as a particular writing system, family grouping, foreign language 
system, or professional group.  Individual characteristics are those which are personal or 
peculiar letters or letter combinations, which, taken together, would not occur in the 
writing of another person. 
 31. See generally id. § 7.3.2(c); D. Michael Risinger, Whose Fault?: Daubert, the NAS Report 
and the Notion of Error in Forensic Science, FORDHAM URB. L.J. (forthcoming 2011). 
 32. See, e.g., Jan Beck, Sources of Error in Forensic Handwriting Evaluation, 40 J. FORENSIC 
SCI. 78 (1995); Silvia Bozza et al., Probabilistic Evaluation of Handwriting Evidence: Likelihood Ratio 
for Authorship, 57 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y SERIES C: APPLIED STAT. 329 (2008); Stephen G. 
Bunch, Consecutive Matching Striation Criteria: A General Critique, 45 J. FORENSIC SCI. 955 (2000); 
Christopher Champed, Edmond Locard — Numerical Standards & “Probable” Identifications, 45 J. 
FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 136 (1995); Christophe Champod et al, Establishing the Most 
Appropriate Databases for Addressing Source Level Propositions, 44 SCI. & JUST. 153 (2004); Itiel E. 
Dror et al., Contextual Information Renders Experts Vulnerable to Making Erroneous Identifications, 
156 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 74 (2006); Itiel E. Dror & Robert Rosenthal, Meta-analytically 
Quantifying the Reliability and Biasability of Forensic Experts, 53 J. FORENSIC SCI. 900 (2008); Itiel E. 
Dror & David Charlton, Why Experts Make Errors, 56 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 600 (2006); 
Adrian G. Dyer et al., An Insight Into Forensic Document Examiner Expertise for Discriminating 
Between Forged and Disguised Signatures, 53 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1154 (2008); Bryan Found & Doug 
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as of yet, the research basis that would permit a satisfying scientific answer 
to any of the above questions does not exist. 
To be sure, we also recognize that the absence of evidence is not 
necessarily evidence of absence.33  Until recently, virtually no institution—
not the courts, not government funding agencies, very few research 
organizations or forensic science laboratories—was investing a great deal of 
time, energy, or resources into answering these questions.34  We therefore 
lack any major body of published scientific research directed at empirically 
 
Rogers, The Probative Character of Forensic Handwriting Examiners’ Identification and Elimination 
Opinions on Questioned Signatures, 178 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 54 (2008); Moshe Kam et al., 
Signature Authentication by Forensic Document Examiners, 46 J. FORENSIC SCI. 884 (2001); Moshe 
Kam & Erwei Lin, Writer Identification Using Hand-Printed and Non-Hand-Printed Questioned 
Documents, 48 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1391 (2003); Glenn Langenburg, A Performance Study of the ACE-
V Process: A Pilot Study to Measure the Accuracy, Precision, Reproducibility, Repeatability, and 
Biasability of Conclusion Resulting From the ACE-V Process, 59 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 219 
(2009); Glenn Langenburg et al., Testing for Potential Contextual Bias Effects During the Verification 
Stage of the ACE-V Methodology When Conducting Fingerprint Comparisons, 54 J. FORENSIC SCI. 571 
(2009); D. Meuwly, Forensic Individualisation From Biometric Data, 46 SCI. & JUST. 205 (2006); 
Cedric Neumann et al., Computation of Likelihood Ratios in Fingerprint Identification for 
Configurations of Any Number of Minutiæ, 52 J. FORENSIC SCI. 54 (2007); Beatrice Schiffer & 
Christophe Champod, The Potential (Negative) Influence of Observational Biases at the Analysis Stage 
of Fingermark Individualisation, 167 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 116 (2007); Sargur N. Srihari et al., 
Discriminability of Fingerprints of Twins, 58 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 109 (2008); Sargur N. 
Srihari et al., Individuality of Handwriting, 47 J. FORENSIC SCI. 856 (2002); Kasey Wertheim et al., 
A Report of Latent Print Examiner Accuracy During Comparison Training Exercises, 56 J. FORENSIC 
IDENTIFICATION 55 (2006); Steve Gutowski, Error Rates in Fingerprint Examination: The View in 
2006, FORENSIC BULL.,(Nat’l Inst. of Forensic Sci., Austl) Autumn 2006, at 18.  This list is not 
exhaustive and should not be considered an endorsement of particular studies.  While some of the 
research listed above is first rate, other studies may have significant flaws.  But these works do at 
least constitute efforts to examine empirically relevant questions that have often been assumed 
rather than investigated. 
 33. Carl Sagan appears to have originated the felicitous phrasing “absence of evidence is 
not evidence of absence.”  CARL SAGAN, THE DEMON-HAUNTED WORLD: SCIENCE AS A 
CANDLE IN THE DARK 213 (1996).  The difficulty with this aphorism is that the absence of 
evidence supporting a theory following a search for it can be evidence of the falsity of the theory.  
Cf. Elliott Sober, Absence of Evidence and Evidence of Absence: Evidential Transitivity in Connection 
With Fossils, Fishing, Fine-tuning, and Firing Squads, 143 PHIL. STUD. 63 (2009).  However, read in 
context, Sagan was criticizing as “impatience with ambiguity” both the notion that whatever has 
not been proved false must be true and the opposite, that what has not been proved true must be 
false.  SAGAN, supra, at 213.  Inferring validity from the fact that many kinds of forensic science 
have not been proved invalid, and inferring invalidity from the lack of scientific proof of validity 
are both dangers to avoid. 
 34. There have been, to be sure, individuals engaged in some degree of research.  See supra 
note 32.  At the institutional level, there are also limited exceptions to these generalizations: the 
present research efforts emerging from the University of Lausanne and the period at the 
University of California-Berkeley in which several students under the tutelage of chemist and 
forensic scientist Paul Kirk pursued fundamental research in forensics are perhaps the most 
notable.  On the current research program at Lausanne, see, for example, School of Criminal Justice 
(ESC), UNIVERSITÉ DE LAUSANNE, http://www.unil.ch/central/page2904_en.html (last visited 
Oct. 29, 2010). 
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validating the conceptual claims and underpinnings of the pattern 
identification forensic disciplines.35  As a body of research continues to 
emerge, and we learn more about the frequency and types of errors that do 
occur, we may well find that many current practices turn out to have 
tolerably low error rates.  As we develop and validate methods for 
probabilistic assessments of fingerprints, documents, or firearms, we may 
learn that in many circumstances the chances of a coincidental match are 
extremely remote, and we will certainly learn more about how common or 
remote they truly are.  It could turn out that analysts’ experience-based 
intuitive judgments about the correspondence sufficient to declare a match, 
even if not presently quantified or formally specified, are generally quite 
accurate.  It may be that the biasing effects of access to contextual 
information extraneous to the forensic analysis rarely impact an examiner’s 
conclusion or ultimate judgment when the information contained within 
the pattern is otherwise sufficiently clear. 
All of this is possible.  But none of it is yet adequately established.  
While our collective hunches about what the expanding pool of research 
will reveal vary, we all expect that additional, high-quality research will 
confirm that many forensic science techniques, including many kinds of 
pattern and impression evidence, do have a considerable degree of 
discriminatory power; and that there exists significant variation in 
discriminatory power across fields and within any given field, depending 
upon particularized circumstances.36  Furthermore, we all agree that we 
 
35. NAS REPORT, supra note 8, at 107–08 (“Much forensic evidence—including, for 
example, bite marks and firearm and toolmark identifications—is introduced in criminal trials 
without any meaningful scientific validation, determination of error rates, or reliability testing to 
explain the limits of the discipline”).  There are, to be sure, a handful of researchers beginning to 
change this, but a substantial body of work points out the absence of an adequate scientific 
foundation or empirical basis for the forensic sciences.  See, e.g., SIMON A. COLE, SUSPECT 
IDENTITIES: A HISTORY OF FINGERPRINTING AND CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION (2001); Simon A. 
Cole, Is Fingerprint Identification Valid? Rhetorics of Reliability in Fingerprint Proponents’ Discourse, 28 
LAW & POL’Y 109 (2006); David L. Faigman, Anecdotal Forensics, Phrenology, and Other Abject 
Lessons From the History of Science, 59 HASTINGS L. J. 979 (2008); Jennifer L. Mnookin, 
Fingerprint Evidence in an Age of DNA Profiling, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 13 (2001) [hereinafter 
Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence]; Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Validity of Latent Fingerprint 
Identification: Confessions of a Fingerprinting Moderate, 7 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 127 (2008) 
[hereinafter Mnookin, Confessions]; D. Michael Risinger et al., Exorcism of Ignorance as a Proxy for 
Rational Knowledge: The Lessons of Handwriting Identification “Expertise,” 137 U. PA. L. REV. 731 
(1989); Michael J. Saks, The Legal and Scientific Evaluation of Forensic Science (Especially Fingerprint 
Expert Testimony), 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1167, 1186–87 (2003); David A. Stoney, Measurement 
of Fingerprint Individuality, in ADVANCES IN FINGERPRINT TECHNOLOGY 327, 329 (Henry C. Lee 
& R.E. Gaensslen eds., 2d ed. 2001). 
 36. We all would predict, for example, that latent fingerprint identification will turn out to 
have a good deal more discriminatory power across a broader range of circumstances than forensic 
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presently lack sufficient knowledge regarding the precise extent of this 
power or its limits. 
Calling, therefore, for more research into these important questions, is 
both obvious and necessary.  Here, again, we largely agree with the NAS 
Report’s conclusion: 
In most areas of forensic science, no well-defined system exists 
for determining error rates, and proficiency testing shows that some 
examiners perform poorly . . . . 
In most forensic science disciplines, no studies have been 
conducted of large populations to establish the uniqueness of marks 
or features.  Yet, despite the lack of a statistical foundation, 
examiners make probabilistic claims based on their experience.  A 
statistical framework that allows quantification of these claims is 
greatly needed.  These disciplines also critically need to standardize 
and clarify the terminology used in reporting and testifying about the 
results and in providing more information. 
Little rigorous research has been done to validate the basic 
premises and techniques in a number of forensic science disciplines.  
The committee sees no evident reason why conducting such research 
is not feasible . . . .37 
To be sure, calling for more research is hardly a radical or controversial 
suggestion.  Indeed, in the aftermath of the NAS Report, calls for more 
research have been widespread.  Despite the Report’s contentious reception, 
and notwithstanding the significant disagreements within forensic science, 
we cannot actually point to anyone who has argued that more research, in 
the abstract, is a bad idea.  We have certainly heard it said that more 
research is not needed for basic validation.38  We have heard it said that the 
 
odontology (bitemark analysis).  On bitemarks, see Mary A. Bush et al., Statistical Evidence for the 
Similarity of the Human Dentition, 56 J. FORENSIC SCI. (forthcoming 2011); D. Michael Risinger, 
Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty Being Left on the Dock?, 64 ALB. L. 
REV. 99 (2000); Michael J. Saks, Merlin & Solomon: Lessons From the Law’s Formative Encounters 
With Forensic Identification Science, 49 HASTINGS L. J. 1069 (1998).  On the need to focus on the 
particularized task at hand rather than making global, field-wide admissibility judgments, see 
generally, D. Michael Risinger, Defining the “Task at Hand”: Non-Science Forensic Science After 
Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767 (2000). 
 37. NAS REPORT, supra 8, at 188–89. 
 38. See The AFTE Comm. for the Advancement of the Sci. of Firearm and Tool Mark 
Identification, The Response of the Association of Firearm and Tool Mark Examiners to the February 
2009 National Academy of Science Report “Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path 
Forward”, 41 AFTE J. 204, 205 (2009) (“There is an extensive body of research, extending back 
over one hundred years, which establishes the accuracy, reliability, and validity of conclusions 
rendered in the field of firearm and toolmark identification.”); Jeffrey G. Barnes, History, in THE 
FINGERPRINT SOURCEBOOK 1–17 (2010), available at 
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costs of research need to be balanced against other needs.  And we have 
heard it said that forensic science laboratories are too busy to undertake, or 
even participate, in research.  While not everyone views more research as 
imperative, we are not aware of anyone who, in print, or even in the 
hallways of conferences or crime labs, opposes the very idea of research in 
the abstract. 
But “more research,” imprecisely defined, is not enough.  What 
forensic science needs is the creation and institutionalization of a research 
culture. 
II. WHAT IS A RESEARCH CULTURE? 
What do we mean by a research culture?  Put simply, we mean a 
culture in which the question of the relationship between research-based 
knowledge and laboratory practices is both foregrounded and central.  We 
mean a culture in which the following questions are primary: What do we 
know?  How do we know that?  How sure are we about that?  We mean a 
culture in which these questions are answered by reference to data, to 
published studies, and to publically accessible materials, rather than 
primarily by reference to experience or craft knowledge, or simply assumed 
to be true because they have long been assumed to be true. 
Before elaborating on the meaning of a research culture—and before 
presenting examples of the absence of a deep and robust research culture 
within forensic science together with suggestions for how to build it—it is 
critical to make one point: While we firmly believe that a research culture 
needs to become both more central and more entrenched within forensic 
science more generally, and within the pattern and impression disciplines 
specifically, this does not—and should not—mean that all forensic 
practitioners should henceforth be doing research.  To the contrary.  Even 
 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/225321.pdf (“Study, research, and experimentation have led to 
and supported fingerprints as a means of individualization and a forensic tool of incalculable value.  
The research and practical knowledge accumulated over the course of many centuries well support 
the science.”); Memorandum From Robert J. Garrett, President, Int’l Ass’n for Identification 
(IAI), to Members, IAI (Feb. 19, 2009), 
http://www.theiai.org/current_affairs/nas_memo_20090219.pdf (“There is no research to suggest 
that properly trained and professionally guided examiners cannot reliably identify whole or partial 
fingerprint impressions to the person from whom they originated.”); SWGGUN Systemic 
Requirements/Recommendations for the Forensic Firearm and Toolmark Laboratory, SCIENTIFIC 
WORKING GROUP FOR FIREARMS & TOOLMARKS, 
http://www.swggun.org/guidelinedocs/SWGGUN%20Systemic%20Requirements.pdf (last 
modified Apr. 23, 2010) (“The reliability of the science has been demonstrated and supported 
through proficiency tests and validity studies over many decades.”). 
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with a research culture in place, most forensic practitioners will continue 
simply to practice forensic science.  Some forensic practitioners might be 
“test subjects” for researchers—the objects of research study to help achieve 
a better understanding of the strengths and limitations of their methods and 
techniques.  They might sometimes partner with researchers to develop 
projects, or to evaluate the practical feasibility of a given research design; 
on other occasions, they might assess what research needs they deem 
especially significant.  But even these practitioners need not, and indeed 
often should not, be the primary producers of the research themselves.39 
Medicine provides an instructive analogy.  Modern medicine is a 
product of both craft knowledge and structured research.  Whether 
medicine incorporates more of a research culture than forensic science is 
perhaps debatable, but certainly evidence-based medicine coexists with a 
more experience-based, clinical practice orientation still widely influential 
among doctors.40  The point for our purposes, however, is that many more 
physicians make use of research than produce it.  Some physicians certainly 
do pursue research alongside clinical practice,41 but large numbers of 
physicians make regular use of empirical research in selecting their 
diagnoses and treatment regimes without participating in its production. 
Their training may enable them to be intelligent consumers of medical 
research, but this does not mean they have the skills or the motivation to 
conduct it on their own. 
Similarly, our hope for a more robust research culture in forensic 
science would not turn every forensic scientist into a scientific researcher.  
Some practicing forensic scientists would no doubt participate in 
 
 39. On the ways that forensic scientists may feel “role ambiguity” that makes them 
uncomfortable with the idea of being research subjects, see Simon A. Cole, Comment on ‘Scientific 
Validation of Fingerprint Evidence Under Daubert’, 7 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 119, 122 (2008). 
 40. See Simon A. Cole, Toward Evidence-Based Evidence: Supporting Forensic Knowledge 
Claims in the Post-Daubert Era, 43 TULSA L. REV. 263 (2007).  On evidence-based medicine, see, 
for example, DAVID L. SACKETT ET AL., EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE: HOW TO PRACTICE & 
TEACH EBM (1997); WILLIAM A. SILVERMAN, WHERE’S THE EVIDENCE? DEBATES IN MODERN 
MEDICINE (1998); STEFAN TIMMERMANS & MARC BERG, THE GOLD STANDARD: THE 
CHALLENGE OF EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE AND STANDARDIZATION IN HEALTH CARE (2003); 
Evidence-Based Medicine Working Group, Evidence-Based Medicine—A New Approach to Teaching 
the Practice of Medicine, 268 JAMA 2420 (1992); David L. Sackett et al., Evidence-Based Medicine: 
What It Is and What It Isn’t, 312 BRIT. MED. J. 71 (1996); Stefan Timmermans & Aaron Mauck, 
The Promise and Pitfalls of Evidence Based Medicine, 24 HEALTH AFF. 18 (2005).  For a classic 
reflection on the sometimes strained relationship between science, research, and the clinical 
practice of medicine, see LEWIS THOMAS, THE YOUNGEST SCIENCE: NOTES OF A MEDICINE-
WATCHER (1983). 
 41. Many biomedical researchers have both PhDs and MDs, but there are also many 
research physicians with MDs alone. 
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conducting research and, as we shall argue below, there ought to be greater 
incentives in place to create a larger pool of “two-hat” forensic 
practitioners—individuals who are well trained in a forensic discipline and 
who have also received substantial formal training in research 
methodologies.  More generally, rank-and-file forensic practitioners without 
special research-oriented training should be taught through both training 
and laboratory practice to have respect for research findings.  Through 
appropriate hiring and training, forensic practitioners can understand the 
value of a research culture and apply research findings in practice.  But just 
as a novice ought not to walk into a forensic science laboratory and begin 
analyzing casework, neither should forensic practitioners—even those with 
a bachelor’s degree in a scientific discipline and a master’s degree in forensic 
science—be expected, or even necessarily encouraged, to develop or 
execute a research program on their own.  Many practitioners can certainly 
assist with research—not only by being test subjects, but also by helping to 
generate research agendas regarding the questions that would help them do 
their job more effectively, and by partnering with statisticians, 
psychologists, computer scientists, physical scientists, and research-oriented 
forensic scientists.  But to reiterate: A research culture in forensic science 
would not turn most practicing forensic scientists into researchers. 
What, then, is a research culture?  We cannot succeed in providing a 
robust and complete definition of a research culture, nor shall we attempt to 
do so.  But we can usefully describe core constellations of values that are 
necessary pieces of a well-functioning research culture in any discipline.  
We believe these core values are empiricism, transparency, and an ongoing 
critical perspective; we elaborate on each below. 
A. Empiricism 
A research culture should have a deep and fundamental respect for the 
ideal of empirical support.  Claims, both about a field and about particulars, 
should be expected as a matter of course to be data-driven.  Moreover, 
thoughtful attention should focus on the degree to which the body of 
available data supports any given claim, and on the relationship between 
research results, the claim made, and the degree of confidence expressed.  
Hunches—or claims based on anecdote or personal experience—ought not 
have the same status as knowledge justified by a substantial body of 
rigorously produced data.  Research that is deeply methodologically flawed 
should be given no credence.  Moreover, research that is methodologically 
sound should not be touted as offering support for propositions that extend 
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beyond the reach of the research design.  In short, the extent of sound 
empirical support for claims should guide practices in the laboratory, 
conclusions in reports, and testimony in the courtroom. 
B. Transparency 
A research culture maximizes transparency, both in the production of 
knowledge and in internal practices and procedures.  Researchers should be 
encouraged to make data sets available to other researchers, both to share 
the particular basis for their own claims and to encourage further research.  
To the extent feasible, laboratories should assist in the production of data 
sets that can help address key research inquiries, and laboratory personnel 
should be willing to participate in research projects both as collaborators 
and as test subjects.  To be sure, laboratories may need to delimit access for 
practical or legal reasons, and laboratory personnel may need to participate 
as research subjects only to the degree it does not interfere with ongoing 
operations.  But access to data and to examiners as test subjects ought not 
to depend on being a practicing forensic scientist (as opposed to a 
researcher from another discipline), nor should it require giving a laboratory 
veto power or control over publication or dissemination of the results.  
More generally, information about ordinary laboratory practices, 
procedures, and protocols should be publically available. 
In addition, errors should be recognized as an inevitable part of any 
human enterprise.  Errors should be acknowledged rather than buried under 
the carpet.  Both the individual and the community should take the 
opportunity to learn from them.  We do recognize that forensic laboratories 
and forensic examiners work within an adversarial legal system.  Certainly 
the us-versus-them mentality that adversarialism generates can discourage 
disclosure beyond what is legally mandated.  The dynamics of cross-
examination, in which ordinary human limitations and innocent 
inconsistencies may be leveraged by opposing counsel into challenges to 
credibility, can exacerbate this tendency.  These forces may combine to 
create significant pressures opposing transparency.  While we do understand 
this tension—and in the final Part of this Article, we offer some suggestions 
for managing it42—we reiterate that transparency is a critical value of a 
functioning research culture. 
 
 42. See infra, Part IV. 
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C. Ongoing Critical Perspective 
Claims of knowledge should be taken as provisional and subject to 
revision in the face of new information.  Dogma should be resisted.  
Research is not one thing, or one study, or once done, never reexamined.  
Research is an ongoing, incremental process.  Research problems should be 
approached with an open mind.  While it is certainly appropriate to have a 
hypothesis, or preliminary expectation, about what any given research study 
will show, investigators should follow the data whether or not it supports 
their original hypothesis, and whether or not it legitimates current 
practices.  Research projects should be designed according to the norms of 
relevant academic fields.  They should not be designed defensively, to 
produce, or to increase the chances of producing, a particular outcome.43  
Publication and peer review should occur as a matter of course, and a 
commitment to publication should not depend on the results.  At the same 
time, we must recognize that the questions that scientific research attempts 
to answer and the questions that must be answered in a courtroom during a 
trial are very different.  Science is a moving target; answers are always 
provisional and can be updated as research produces new information or 
challenges accepted findings.  But in a trial, the judge or jury must make 
pragmatic use of the best available answers to scientific questions at that 
given moment in time.  As a result, the legal system may quite legitimately 
accept evidence, even scientific evidence, that is good enough rather than 
perfect.44  Waiting for the next study, or postponing a decision, is typically 
not an option.  But these determinations, while decisive in a particular case, 
should remain epistemically provisional, subject to critical inquiry and 
revision in a future case if the research warrants it. 
 
 43. For an example of a recent research study that was criticized along these lines, see Lisa 
J. Hall & Emma Player, Will the Introduction of an Emotional Context Affect Fingerprint Analysis and 
Decision-Making? 181 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 36 (2008).  For the criticisms, see Itiel E. Dror, On 
Proper Research and Understanding of the Interplay Between Bias and Decision Outcomes, 191 
FORENSIC SCI. INT’L e17 (2009); Michael J. Saks, Concerning L.J. Hall, E. Player, “Will the 
Introduction of an Emotional Context Affect Fingerprint Analysis and Decision-Making?”, 191 
FORENSIC SCI. INT’L e19 (2009).  For the study authors’ response to these criticisms, see Lisa J. 
Hall & Emma Player, The Value of Practitioner Research in the Field of Fingerprint Analysis, 191 
FORENSIC SCI. INT’L e15 (2009) (responding to Dror’s criticism); Lisa J. Hall & Emma Player, The 
Value of Practitioner Research in the Field of Fingerprint Analysis, 191 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L e21 
(2009) (responding to Saks’ criticism). 
 44. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Mnookin, Of Black Boxes, Instruments, and Experts: Testing the 
Validity of Forensic Science, 5 EPISTEME 343 (2008); Dale A. Nance, Reliability and the Admissibility 
of Experts, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 191 (2003). 
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III. THE PRESENT LACK OF A RESEARCH CULTURE IN 
FORENSIC SCIENCE 
A growing number of individuals within the pattern identification 
disciplines and other forensic fields do fundamentally embrace the values 
associated with a research culture.  Nonetheless, at present, these values are 
not sufficiently widespread within the pattern identification communities.  
In this Part, we provide a variety of examples that illustrate the ways in 
which a research culture is still weak or absent in these disciplines. 
In court, forensic analysts asked about the bases for their claims 
frequently refer to experience and training rather than providing any 
systematic data.  Experience is a legitimate basis for certain kinds of 
knowledge, but it is deeply problematic for experience alone to be the basis 
for sweeping claims like individualization.45  Moreover, without robust 
feedback mechanisms to detect and provide information about any possible 
mistake, experience cannot be a sound warrant for reaching valid 
conclusions.46  If, for example, a document examiner generally has no 
 
 45. Individualization is the assertion that an item can be identified to a unique, specific 
source—that a print can be identified to a particular finger, to the exclusion of every other finger 
in the universe; or that a handwriting specimen can be identified as belonging to one and only 
one particular author out of the entire human population.  Because no individual examiner can 
ever examine every possible specimen in the universe, experience alone cannot justify a claim of 
individualization, assuming that the potential population of the source is substantial.  See, e.g., 
KAYE, BERNSTEIN & MNOOKIN, supra note 3, § 7.3.2(c)(2) (“The least useful measures of errors 
are self-congratulatory statements of the practitioners of a technique.  In the absence of 
systematic, unbiased efforts to root out errors, these estimates amount to little more than reports of 
the ‘I don't remember being proved wrong’ variety.”).  Whether individualization might ever be a 
plausible claim is a far harder question, and one upon which the authors of this Article do not all 
agree.  See, e.g., Simon A. Cole, Forensics Without Uniqueness, Conclusions Without 
Individualization: The New Epistemology of Forensic Identification, 8 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 233 
(2009); Kaye, supra note 27; Jonathan J. Koehler & Michael J. Saks, Individualization Claims in 
Forensic Science: Still Unwarranted, 75 BROOK. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010); Michael J. Saks & 
Jonathan J. Koehler, The Individualization Fallacy in Forensic Science Evidence, 61 VAND. L. REV. 
199 (2008).  But we do agree that experience examining latent prints—even extensive experience 
looking at tens of thousands of prints—does not provide an adequate warrant for the assertion of 
individualization. 
 46. KAYE, BERNSTEIN & MNOOKIN, supra note 3, § 10.3.3 (“Numerous studies have found 
that without quick and accurate feedback on correct and incorrect judgments, experience does not 
produce expertise and experts routinely overestimate their skills. . . .  Casework in forensic 
handwriting analysis, latent fingerprint identification, toolmark identification, and other patterns 
and impression evidence comparisons rarely involve . . . feedback based on ground truth.  The 
argument that the judgments of these analysts are valid merely because the practitioners have had 
specialized training or ample experience therefore is unimpressive.”); see D. Michael Risinger & 
Michael J. Saks, Science and Nonscience in the Courts: Daubert Meets Handwriting Identification 
Expertise, 82 IOWA L. REV. 21, 33–34 (1996); Mnookin, supra note 44.  Even outside forensic 
science, other disciplines vary with regard to the extent of feedback provided by experience.  
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independent knowledge of whether or not her conclusions in any given case 
are actually correct, how can she learn from her experience?  If she never 
knows when or if she makes an error, how can she adjust her practices to 
increase accuracy?  At present, the efforts to create these kinds of feedback 
mechanisms are minimal.  For example, no laboratory of which we are 
aware conducts blind proficiency tests that are given in the stream of 
casework in a pattern or impression discipline, or, for that matter, in any 
other forensic discipline.  Airport security staff, by contrast, are frequently 
tested covertly in a variety of ways as part of their ordinary workstream.47  
In one scheme, electronic images of dangerous materials are superimposed 
onto actual passengers’ carryons.  Other testing, conducted independently 
by several agencies, includes no-notice testing of inert bomb parts, weapons, 
and other prohibited materials.  The TSA explains on its website, “Covert 
testing is a critical element of the aviation security system.  It measures 
effectiveness, identifies vulnerabilities, constantly adapts to challenge 
officers while incorporating intelligence in a useable way.  Simply put, 
without adopting difficult, covert testing, the aviation security system 
would not be as effective as it is.”48  Would forensic science not also benefit 
from covert testing?  Another potentially beneficial technique for assessing 
strengths and vulnerabilities is randomly selected case audits to seek out 
mistakes or assess the quality of analyses conducted.  Some laboratories do 
carry out such audits, but neither standard practice nor accreditation 
requirements insist upon it.  Institutionalizing procedures like these would 
serve to check the quality and effectiveness of examiners’ experience and 
would provide critical information about accuracy.49 
 
Physicians, for example, get more feedback than forensic examiners via patient outcomes, but this 
is a noisy signal—patients sometimes recover despite care rather than because of it, and even 
effective therapies may be ineffective in a given instance either due to bad luck or confounding 
issues.  Mechanics, for example, have better access to feedback than either forensic scientists or 
doctors: Automobiles are not self-healing and their mechanisms are less complex than bodies. 
 47. The variety of tests employed are briefly described on the website of the Transportation 
Security Administration.  Covert Testing: Security Screening, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY 
ADMINISTRATION, http://www.tsa.gov/what_we_do/screening/covert_testing.shtm [hereinafter 
TSA] (last visited Dec. 26, 2010); see also Dror, supra note 25, at 103. 
 48. TSA, supra note 47. 
 49. There are, to be sure, some proficiency tests currently in use.  But they are not 
conducted blindly, nor are they necessarily performed by individual examiners working alone, 
without collaboration or assistance from colleagues.  Nor, for the most part, does their difficulty 
level mirror actual casework.  On the problems with the current proficiency tests in use in the 
pattern identification field and the potential for using proficiency tests as a method for assessing 
accuracy, see Lyn Haber & Ralph Norman Haber, Error Rates for Human Fingerprint Examiners, in 
AUTOMATIC FINGERPRINT RECOGNITION SYSTEMS 339 (Nalini Ratha & Ruud Bolle eds., 2004); 
Simon A. Cole, More Than Zero: Accounting for Error in Latent Fingerprint Identification, 95 J. 
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Many forensic scientists are too willing to infer scientific validity from 
the fact of longstanding use.50  It is true that some of these forensic 
techniques have been in use for a substantial period.51  It is also true that 
 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 985 (2005); Lyn Haber & Ralph Norman Haber, Scientific Validation of 
Fingerprint Evidence Under Daubert, 7 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK, 87 (2008); Jonathan J. Koehler, 
Fingerprint Error Rates and Proficiency Tests: What They Are and Why They Matter, 59 HASTINGS 
L.J. 1077 (2008); Mnookin, Confessions, supra note 35; D. Michael Risinger et al., The 
Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects in Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation 
and Suggestion, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2002); Jonathan J. Koehler, Proficiency Tests to Estimate 
Error Rates in the Forensic Sciences 1–5, (Sept. 19, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
Northwestern University School of Law). 
As for auditing, although the American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors Laboratory 
Accreditation Board (ASCLD-LAB) does audit some cases as part of its accreditation process, this 
review takes place only once every five years, and cases reviewed are not selected at random.  For 
a recent instance in which an accredited laboratory had significant problems in its blood analysis 
not found through the accreditation process, see Locke & Neff, supra note 5.  On ASCLD-Lab 
Accreditation Requirements, see ASCLD/LAB-INTERNATIONAL, ASCLD/LAB, INC., 
INTERNATIONAL ACCREDITATION PROGRAM: PROGRAM OVERVIEW (2006). 
 50. See United States v. Llera Plaza, Nos. CR. 98-362-10, CR. 98-362-11, CR. 98-362-12 
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2002) (“‘[T]he ACE-V process and the experts’ conclusions have been tested 
empirically over a period of 100 years . . . .’” (quoting Gov’t Mot. & Resp. at 112)); United States 
v. Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d 848, 854 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (“[T]he methods of latent print 
identification can be and have been tested.  They have been tested for roughly 100 years.  They 
have been tested in adversarial proceedings with the highest possible stakes—liberty and 
sometimes life.”); Transcript of Trial—Day Three at 114–15, United States v. Mitchell, No 96-
407 (E.D. Pa. July 9, 1999) (“[E]mpirical studies is when you roll up your sleeves, you do 
observational analysis.  The idea of taking prints, comparing them to other prints to seeing how 
often things are similar or dissimilar, is empirical studies.  The 100 years of fingerprint 
employment has been empirical studies.”) (testimony of Bruce Budowle); David L. Grieve, Simon 
Says, 51 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 85, 95 (2001) (“The testability of fingerprint individuality 
has been conducted for nearly a century, perhaps not in one grand empirical study that captivated 
the [Daubert] defense, but in the countless smaller studies performed daily in all parts of the 
globe.”); Willam F. Leo, Fingerprint Identification: Objective Science or Subjective Opinion?, 17 PRINT 
1, 2 (2001) (“A fingerprint examiner’s knowledge and ability can be and is tested, is documented 
and can be verified, and is evaluated by the courts and juries every time the examiner takes the 
witness stand.”); 60 Minutes: Fingerprints, (CBS television broadcast (Jan. 5, 2003) (“We’re 
winning 41 times out of 41 [admissibility] challenges.  I think that says something.  We have 100 
years of experience; let’s make sure that that’s clearly out there.  And if it wasn’t reliable, this 
certainly would have been discovered many, many years ago.”).  But see Bruce Budowle et al., A 
Perspective on Errors, Bias, and Interpretation in the Forensic Sciences and Direction for Continuing 
Advancement, 54 J. FORENSIC SCI. 798, 799 (2009) (“[F]or many years the forensic science 
community has pointed to successful admissibility of its science findings, and the opportunity to 
cross examine expert witnesses, as support of a technique’s ‘general acceptance’ and 
‘reliability’ . . . .  [P]hilosophically we do not advocate successful admissibility as demonstrating 
good science.”). 
 51. For an example of the early history of fingerprint evidence, see generally COLE, supra 
note 35; Jennifer L. Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence in an Age of DNA Profiling, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 
13 (2001).  For the history of handwriting identification evidence, see generally Jennifer L. 
Mnookin, Scripting Expertise: The History of Handwriting Identification Evidence and the Judicial 
Construction of Reliability, 87 VA. L. REV. 1723 (2001) [hereinafter Mnookin, Scripting Expertise]; 
Risinger et al., supra note 35; D. Michael Risinger, Mark Denbeaux & Michael J. Saks, Exorcism of 
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the number of proven errors for some of these techniques is small relative to 
the frequency of use (though certainly greater than zero).52  And it is true 
that those pieces of information, combined, provide a degree of support for 
the claim that latent fingerprint identification, for example, likely has a 
substantial degree of accuracy (though this evidence obviously does not 
permit quantification of the precise degree of accuracy).  Furthermore, 
whenever a pattern analyst matches an exemplar to a source, and highly 
probative, independent evidence of guilt subsequently emerges (or already 
existed but was unknown to the examiner), this corroborating information 
provides some indication that the identification technique works, 
notwithstanding that case information alone can never provide absolute 
assurance about ground truth.  Moreover, if these techniques were being 
widely used but misidentifying sources at an extremely high rate, one might 
expect that in some of these cases, powerful contrary evidence supporting 
innocence would emerge and throw the identification technique’s general 
accuracy into doubt.53 
While we do therefore grant that this longstanding use establishes 
something, it establishes less than its advocates suggest.  First, the very fact 
that many kinds of pattern evidence are believed to be especially powerful 
and persuasive kinds of proof makes inferring validity from its success 
dangerous.  If a fingerprint error leads to a misidentification, might the 
identified individual nonetheless be convicted, or even plead guilty to avoid 
a stronger sanction at trial, in the face of evidence that seems virtually 
indisputable?  Convictions, therefore, do not necessarily establish the 
accuracy of the evidence undergirding them.  To argue otherwise is a form 
of rhetorical bootstrapping.  Further support of this point is provided by 
numerous failures to uncover errors until well after conviction, and 
sometimes only through highly fortuitous circumstances.54  Moreover, the 
growth of searchable databases with millions of latent fingerprints may 
create significant new dangers because a large database increases the 
chances of finding prints from different sources with a high degree of 
 
Ignorance as a Proxy for Rational Knowledge: The Lessons of Handwriting Identification Expertise, 137 
U. PA. L. REV. 731 (1989). 
 52. Cole, supra note 49. 
 53. We make this last point with caution, because strong evidence can likely only be 
beaten by equally strong evidence.  If, for example, fingerprints are widely seen as dispositive, the 
emergence of other evidence strongly suggesting innocence may be dismissed as erroneous in the 
face of the fingerprint evidence. 
 54. Cole, supra note 49, at 1020–23. 
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coincidental similarity.55  In addition, defense challenges to fingerprint 
evidence, firearms comparison, and other pattern evidence, have been, 
until recently, very unusual;56 as a result, these techniques have operated in 
court as if they were almost self-proving.57 
The key point is that longstanding use leads some forensic scientists 
(and many judges) to treat questions of scientific and systematic validation 
as moot, or at a minimum, not terribly important.58  A research culture 
would care about, and be willing to invest in, rigorous empirical validation 
even of those matters widely thought to be obvious by practicing forensic 
scientists. 
In addition, a research culture would realize that casework is not 
research.  To be sure, researchers may introduce research questions into the 
stream of what looks to an analyst like ordinary casework.  Covert research 
of this sort can provide some of the most ecologically valid data about 
actual practices.  Research could also entail examining casework in a 
structured manner.  But an analyst engaged in ordinary casework is not 
herself conducting research.59  Casework may suggest research problems 
worth exploring.  It may lead to hypotheses worth developing.  Unusual 
case findings may be worth discussing at professional meetings or publishing 
as food for thought.  Indeed, the International Association of Identification 
(IAI) routinely publishes such materials in its journal, and they may 
provide useful platforms for discussion and expand the experiential basis 
available to practitioners.  But case findings ought not to be mistaken for 
structured research or empirical data that goes beyond the anecdotal, 
 
 55. Itiel E. Dror & Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Use of Technology in Human Expert Domains: 
Challenges and Risks Arising From the Use of Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems in Forensic 
Science 9 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 47, 58 (2010).  Databases also play a role in firearms 
comparison, though the scale of images in the database is significantly smaller than the largest 
automated fingerprint identification systems. 
 56. To be sure, in some cases defense counsel may consult with defense experts in 
fingerprint identification but elect not to present any defense challenge.  While we have no data 
on the frequency of such consultations, our point is that the testimony has typically been 
presented to the factfinder unchallenged.  See generally, COLE, supra note 35; Mnookin, supra note 
35. 
 57. In the early history of handwriting cases, and at present, in civil disputes, document 
examination has tended to have competing experts on both sides.  But this has not generally 
extended to criminal disputes, especially in modern times.  See Mnookin, Scripting Expertise, supra 
note 51, at 1730; Risinger et al., supra note 35; Risinger & Saks, supra note 46. 
 58. See, e.g., Anil K. Jain et al., On the Similarity of Identical Twin Fingerprints, 35 PATTERN 
RECOGNITION 2653 (2002).  For criticism of this approach as unfaithful to Daubert’s call for 
scientific validation, see KAYE, BERNSTEIN & MNOOKIN, supra note 3, § 7.3.2(a)(4) (arguing that 
“adversarial testing is not scientific testing”); see also Mnookin, supra note 4, at 36–37. 
 59. Simon A. Cole, ‘Implicit Testing’: Can Casework Validate Forensic Techniques?, 46 
JURIMETRICS J. 117 (2006). 
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whether or not such findings are published.60  Unlike planned research, 
casework does not permit the development of careful controls, defined 
independent variables, or structured and directed focus.  Also, and 
critically, in casework, ground truth is not known and cannot simply be 
inferred by a conviction, a confession, or the consensus judgment of 
experts. 
However, we do not mean to set up an unrealistically idealized vision 
of real research.  Legitimate research can vary in its degree of formality and 
ecological validity.  Often, very good research necessarily simplifies some 
aspects of the real world to focus attention on the matter at issue and to 
limit potentially confounding variables.  Good research can, and usually 
does, involve both hard questions of design and imperfect compromises.  
But research does, and must, involve explicit study design.  And research 
reports and publications, comporting with the research culture value of 
transparency, must be as explicit as is feasible about the nature of the study 
design.61 
Forensic analysts have often failed to recognize the limits of what 
conclusions are actually warranted by a given research result.  Research is 
sometimes used to support conclusions that the data in question simply does 
not establish.  For example, in fingerprint analysis, evidence that supports 
wide variation in human friction ridge detail is frequently offered to support 
the examiner’s ability to match unknown prints to a source.62  While the 
 
 60. For examples of the publication of such case studies from fingerprint identification, see, 
Michael H. Kershaw, Laterally Reversed, 50 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 138 (2000); Robert D. 
Reneau, Unusual Latent Print Examinations, 53 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 531 (2003); Dana 
Shinozuka, Fingerprints on a Banana Leaf, 50 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 441 (2000). 
 61. Transparency does of course have its limits.  Among other reasons, confidentiality 
concerns and maintaining the integrity of the project—which may mean, for example, that 
examiners do not necessarily know when they are being studied—may require a degree of secrecy.  
For discussions of the importance of study design, see, for example, KAYE, BERNSTEIN & 
MNOOKIN, supra note 3, § 12.5 (discussing “the importance of the design of studies”); HANS 
ZEISEL & DAVID H. KAYE, PROVE IT WITH FIGURES: EMPIRICAL METHODS IN LAW AND 
LITIGATION 11 (1997) (discussing compromises such as “half-a-loaf” experiments to design 
workable studies); David H. Kaye & David A. Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, in 
REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 83 (Federal Judicial Ctr. ed., 2d ed. 2000). 
 62. For a variety of examples of this rhetorical move, see those discussed in Cole, supra 
note 45, at 235–40.  For a recent example of an analysis that makes use of this argument, see, for 
example, Peter E. Peterson et al., Latent Prints: A Perspective on the State of the Science, 11 
FORENSIC SCI. COMM., (2009), available at 
http://www2.fbi.gov/hq/lab/fsc/backissu/oct2009/review/2009_10_review01.htm.  This Article 
does recognize in passing that latent examiners “do not compare friction ridge skin directly” but 
rather examine two-dimensional representations that may introduce additional interpretive 
concerns.  Id.  But while numerous citations are offered in support of the premises of persistence 
and individuality of friction ridge skin, the only citation offered to support the claim that latent 
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assertion that every fingerprint is different is an inductive claim that cannot 
definitively be proven empirically (because it is impossible to look at every 
fingerprint that has ever existed or will exist), the available empirical 
evidence does support the claims that a high degree of variation in human 
friction ridge detail exists and that an individual’s friction ridges persist to a 
substantial degree over her lifetime.63  Most of us would even be willing to 
infer, based on what is known, that every human being has prints 
observably distinguishable from those of every other at some “scale of 
detection.”64 
But this claim of variability of rolled or digitized fingerprints65 does not 
establish that fingerprint examiners can therefore individualize prints 
recovered from crime scenes to a particular source or even that the 
techniques of fingerprint comparison necessarily “work.”  The right 
question is not whether all fingerprints actually differ from each other, but 
rather what conclusions the methods of fingerprint comparison permit, and 
in what circumstances.  Even if every set of ten prints is different from every 
other, two specific portions of two prints from different individuals might be 
extraordinarily similar to one another.  And even if every area of friction 
ridge skin is different from every other individual’s inked or scanned print, 
that does not answer whether two such prints from different sources might 
share enough similarity that an examiner, even if competently using the 
techniques of the field, might nonetheless mistakenly attribute them to the 
same unique source. 
Moreover, latent print analysis involves difficulties often not present 
in the analysis of ten prints: Latent images are frequently smaller in surface 
area than the full print; they are possibly distorted; and they often contain 
 
impressions “translate reliably as a true and accurate representation of what appears on the friction 
ridge skin” is an untitled FBI laboratory manuscript listed as “in preparation.”  Id. 
 63. See, e.g., Christopher Champod & Pierre A. Margot, Computer Assisted Analysis of 
Minutiæ Occurrences on Fingerprints, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON 
FINGERPRINT DETECTION AND IDENTIFICATION 305–18 (Joseph Almog & Eliot Springer eds., 
1996); Anil K. Jain et al., On the Similarity of Identical Twin Fingerprints, 35 PATTERN 
RECOGNITION 2653 (2002); Neumann et al., supra note 32, at 54–64; Cédric Neumann et al., 
Computation of Likelihood Ratios in Fingerprint Identification for Configurations of Three Minutiae, 51 
J. FORENSIC SCI. 1255 (2006); Egli, N., Interpretation of Partial Fingermarks Using an Automated 
Fingerprint Identification System.  PhD, Institut de Police Scientifique et Ecole des Sciences 
Criminelles, Université de Lausanne, Lausanne, Suisse: 2009; Ne’urim, Israel, June 26–30, 1995: 
Israel National Police. 
 64. See KEITH INMAN & NORAH RUDIN, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF CRIMINALISTICS: 
THE PROFESSION OF FORENSIC SCIENCE 128 (2001). 
 65. A rolled fingerprint is an impression made with ink—usually black ink on white 
paper—where the individual rolls his inked finger to create a visible impression.  Digitized 
fingerprints involve scanning the friction ridge impression electronically rather than using ink. 
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artifacts resulting from the processes necessary to make a latent print 
visible.66  So, the right question is whether, competently using the tools and 
techniques of latent fingerprint identification, two impressions from two 
different sources might ever be mistaken as coming from the same source 
(or, conversely, whether two impressions from the same finger might 
erroneously be said to come from different sources).  Whether the actual 
ridge patterns on the two fingers in question are or are not “truly” the same 
is not the critical question.  These are significantly different inquiries.  The 
point is to recognize that the claim that friction ridge patterns are highly 
variable might be a necessary precondition for fingerprint identification, 
but it does not establish fingerprint analysts’ ability to make a match.  To 
suggest otherwise reflects a failure to think carefully and critically about the 
relationship between an empirical warrant and the claim that is being 
made. 
Numerous examples within the forensic sciences reveal dogma or 
ideology trumping academic inquiry.  For example, in 2001, two forensic 
science researchers, one of whom was a trained and qualified fingerprint 
examiner in Switzerland, published a commentary on fingerprint 
identification.  In it, they called for abandoning “absolute conclusions.”67  
The authors recognized the inherently probabilistic nature of fingerprint 
evidence; they allowed that the key question was not the uniqueness of 
friction ridge skin, but rather the analyst’s ability to recognize sufficient 
information from very limited information; and they advocated replacing 
experience-and-tradition-based approaches with more transparent and 
empirically justified practices.68  How were these arguments received?  At 
least one commentator responded in print with abject hostility at the 
notion that interloping statisticians would dare upset the apple cart.69  This 
angry critic wrote: 
Once again, identification science is under attack, this time from a 
shotgun blast by statisticians.  They come not to bury fingerprints but 
to praise it.  But as with Shakespeare’s Mark Antony, they actually 
come to incite a riot.  Although their main point is relatively simple, 
 
 66. To be sure, not all fingerprint comparisons involve latent prints.  Sometimes prints 
found in crime scenes are patent prints—left in ink, blood, or otherwise visible without dusting or 
processing. 
 67. Christophe Champod & Ian W. Evett, A Probabilistic Approach to Fingerprint Evidence, 
51 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 101 (2001). 
 68. Id. 
 69. See Steve McKasson, I Think Therefore I Probably Am, 51 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 
217 (2001). 
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it is mired deeply in rhetoric.  One might describe it as opaque rather 
than transparent.70 
The author later asserts: 
This commentary is indeed a vicious attack and any identification 
expert who does not see it as such has not read it closely enough.  
Surely the authors cannot expect that this will cause the scales to fall 
from the eyes of examiners everywhere and that the errors of the last 
hundred years will be revealed at last . . . .  What then can be their 
motive for putting this forward at this time?71 
He finally adds: 
As with most propaganda, it is masked, although not particularly well 
in this instance . . . .  Although this article may be intended to 
demonstrate that identification specialists do not know enough about 
statistics, what it has clearly demonstrated is that statisticians do not 
know enough about identification.72 
It is not clear which is more worthy of note: the vitriol and sarcasm of 
the response, or the fact that the journal published it notwithstanding this 
extraordinary tone. 
More recently, in the face of evidence presented in another article that 
contextual information may bias the decisions of fingerprint analysts,73 one 
commentator responded with the following statements in a letter to the 
editor: 
[A]ny fingerprint examiner who comes to a decision on identification 
and is swayed either way in that decisionmaking process under the 
influence of stories and gory images is either totally incapable of 
performing the noble tasks expected of him/her or is so immature 
that he/she should seek employment at Disneyland. . . .  And I do 
find it rather unsavoury that those within our own ranks, who ought 
to know better and are aware just how reliable the fingerprint system 
is, continue to provide fuel for those within the media and Press who 
seem to relish attacking what is the most valuable tool in the 
investigating officer’s armoury.74 
Rather than discuss the merits of the research, the letter writer attacks 
those test subjects who showed themselves to be susceptible to biasing 
 
 70. Id. at 217 (citation omitted). 
 71. Id. at 221. 
 72. Id. 
 73. The study under discussion was Dror & Charlton, supra note 32. 
 74. Martin Leadbetter, Letter to the Editor, FINGERPRINT WHORLD, Sept. 2007, at 231, 
231. 
A Research Culture for the Forensic Sciences 31 
 
58:3 Mnookin et al Mnookin Final Proof 1 (1/12/2011 3:41:00 PM) 
 
                                                                                                                           
information as incompetent or immature.  Given that psychological 
research shows that all humans are potentially susceptible to the effects of 
biasing information, this letter writer essentially proposed that fingerprint 
examiners might best make a mass exodus to Disneyland. 
To be sure, these examples of blustery responses to unwelcome points 
of view obviously do not represent the views and attitudes of all forensic 
practitioners.  But neither response provoked any apparent public outrage 
from the forensic science community.  Not a single follow-up letter was 
published, criticizing these authors for their sputtering and dogmatic 
responses to thoughtful research and analysis. 
Admittedly, human endeavors are quite frequently dotted with 
examples of resistance to new theories that challenge the status quo.75  
Regardless, a sign of a mature discipline with a well-entrenched research 
culture is a willingness to engage respectfully with opposing viewpoints; it is 
a commitment to focusing on the merits of proposed theories, the 
adequacies of research methodologies, and the assessments of the data 
rather than resorting to inflated rhetoric or personal attacks.  Forensic 
scientists have sometimes found it too easy to respond with a personal 
attack instead of—or layered on top of—substantive assessment of critics’ 
arguments.  Even one of the authors of this Article regrets portions of one 
of his early publications that now seem to him to have taken too derisive a 
tone toward some of the critics of forensic science (including, indeed, other 
authors of this Article).76  In a research culture, participants should, ideally, 
learn from disagreements rather than fear them.  We believe it is a 
significant step forward that those who have found themselves (literally) on 
opposite sides of the courtroom are now, by coauthoring this Article, not 
only willing to engage with one another, but are finding many shared views.  
But the development of a research culture in these areas still has a long way 
to go. 
When accused of being insufficiently research-based, or insufficiently 
linked to academia, practitioners in the pattern identification fields have 
 
 75. Consider, for example, Thomas Kuhn’s famous book, The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions, and his arguments and examples detailing how “normal science” frequently proceeds 
even in the face of anomalous findings, and how most researchers in any given paradigm remain 
bound to it notwithstanding contradictory evidence.  THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF 
SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962).  For further examples, see Bernard Barber, Resistance by 
Scientists to Scientific Discovery, 134 SCIENCE 596 (1961).  Given these attitudes in areas with 
robust commitments to a research culture, it is not surprising to find similar dynamics in an area 
where the research culture commitment remains weak. 
 76. Glenn Langenburg, Defense Against the Dark Arts, 43 CHESAPEAKE EXAMINER 1, 5-6, 
12 (2003). 
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sometimes responded by invoking the scientific foundations articulated by 
the pioneers of their fields.  Whatever the qualifications of these early 
practitioners, in a healthy research culture, the scientific bona fides of a 
profession would be unlikely to depend on these pioneers of the distant 
past.  For example, one published response to an article criticizing the lack 
of adequate scientific foundation in the forensic sciences emphasized the 
academic credentials of forensic pioneers like Calvin Goddard, J. Howard 
Mathews, and Sir Francis Galton.77  Goddard (1891–1955) trained as a 
physician, spent his career partly in the military, and substantially 
contributed to the establishment of forensic firearms comparison as a field.  
J. Howard Mathews (1881–1970) published a major firearms treatise in 
1962,78 ten years after retiring from an academic position in chemistry.  Sir 
Francis Galton (1822–1911) was a significant scientific intellectual of the 
Victorian era, with interests as diverse as meteorology, eugenics, heredity, 
statistical analysis, and fingerprints.79  Without belittling the significant 
intellectual contributions of these pioneers, a robust research culture should 
be continuous and current.  Century-old work or the credentials of 
pioneers, however impressive, has little direct relevance to questions of 
present-day scientific legitimacy.80 
Another major limitation of the current forensic science culture 
relates to several of the publication venues for the pattern identification 
field.  Several of the most significant journals focused on publishing pattern 
identification research simply do not comport with broader norms of access, 
dissemination, or peer review typically associated with scientific publishing.  
For example, the AFTE Journal, a quarterly publication of the Association 
of Firearm and Toolmark Examiners, has published numerous articles on 
firearms identification.81  Worldcat—the largest online catalog of library 
 
 77. CRIME LAB REPORT, FORENSIC PATTERN IDENTIFICATION: A HISTORY LESSON, AND 
SOME ADVICE, FOR SAKS AND FAIGMAN 4 (2009), available at 
http://www.crimelabreport.com/library/pdf/1-09.pdf. 
 78. 1 J. HOWARD MATHEWS, FIREARMS IDENTIFICATION (2d ed. 1973). 
 79. See generally MICHAEL BULMER & FRANCIS GALTON, PIONEER OF HEREDITY AND 
BIOMETRY (2003). 
 80. For similar observations concerning the handwriting identification, see Risinger et al., 
supra note 35, at 738–40.  The handful of formal studies on the “black box” reliability of signature 
authentication has not changed the almost exclusive practical reliance on century-old sources.  Id. 
at 773. 
 81. Many of the articles claimed by firearms analysts to validate their practices have been 
published in AFTE.  See, e.g., Ronald G. Nichols, Defending the Scientific Foundation of the Firearms 
and Tool Mark Identification Discipline: Responding to Recent Challenges, 52 J. FORENSIC SCI. 586 
(2007).  We take no position here on whether these publications and research bases provide an 
adequate foundation for the claims of firearms identification.  Our point is that this journal is 
deemed by members of the community to be a critical publication venue.  For a view critical of 
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materials, which includes the holdings of 72,000 libraries worldwide, 
including virtually every university-based library in the United States—lists 
only eighteen libraries with a copy of this journal in their holdings.82  
Furthermore, the AFTE Journal does not appear to be indexed or included 
in any major indexing service anywhere.83  The only available index to 
AFTE was created by an individual firearms examiner on his own initiative 
and was not continued past 2005.84  Moreover, peer review of submissions 
to AFTE is not blind; the author and the reviewer are both aware of each 
other’s identity.85  In addition, the peer reviewers appear to come entirely 
from the editorial board, which consists entirely of AFTE members, and , 
therefore includes no members from outside the toolmark and firearms 
practitioner community).86  This journal therefore appears to have 
extremely limited dissemination beyond the members of AFTE itself; 
completely lacks integration with any of the voluminous networks for the 
production and exchange of scientific research information; and engages in 
peer review that is neither blind nor draws upon an extensive network of 
 
the research basis of firearms comparison claims, see Adina Schwartz, A Systemic Challenge to the 
Reliability and Admissibility of Firearms and Toolmark Identification, 6 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 
1 (2005). 
 82. WorldCat lists a total of nineteen libraries in three separate file listings.  However, the 
Library of Congress is listed twice.  The American libraries that subscribe to AFTE are, in full: Cal 
State, Sacramento; George Washington University; Stetson University College of Law; Ogeechee 
Technical College; Grambling State University; Truman State University; John Jay College of 
Criminal Justice; Case Western Law School; Mercyhurst College Hammermill Library; George 
Mason University; Virginia Commonwealth University; and the Library of Congress.  To be sure, 
Worldcat’s listings may to a certain degree understate access.  First, despite its extensive 
inclusions, we recognize that some libraries are not in Worldcat.  Second, we recognize that at 
some institutions, if an individual faculty member has a subscription, the library may elect not to 
pay for institutional access.  However, this issue should have a potential effect on all journals 
associated with membership organizations, not simply forensic science journals; and by any 
standard, the number of research libraries subscribing to AFTE is remarkably small.  Moreover, a 
faculty member with access significantly limits broader dissemination to those outside the 
individual faculty member’s ambit. 
 83. This information comes from Ulrichsweb, an authoritative source of information on 
periodicals.  See generally ULRICHSWEB—THE GLOBAL SOURCE FOR PERIODICALS, 
http://www.ulrichsweb.com/ulrichsweb/ (last visited Dec. 30, 2010). 
 84. This index can be downloaded at AFTE Journal Keyword Index ASS’N OF FIREARM & 
TOOL MARK EXAMINERS (Oct. 24, 2005), http://www.afte.org/ExamResources/journalindex.htm.  
It appears to be the individual work of an Albuquerque Police Department firearms examiner. 
 85. See the description at AFTE Peer Review Process, ASS’N OF FIREARM & TOOL MARK 
EXAMINERS (Aug. 2009), http://www.afte.org/Journal/PeerReviewProcess.htm; see also Dominic J. 
Denio, The History of the AFTE Journal, the Peer Review Process, and Daubert Issues, AFTE J., 
Spring 2002, at 210, 210–14. 
 86. Indeed, AFTE membership is, for the most part, open only to practicing firearms and 
toolmark examiners (or those in training for the profession).  For membership categories, see 
http://www.afte.org/Membership/membership.htm.  For a list of the editorial review panel, see 
http://www.afte.org/Journal/EditorsCommittee.htm. 
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researchers.  None of this is compatible with an accessible, rigorous, 
transparent culture of research.87 
The Journal for Forensic Identification (JFI), the journal of the 
International Association of Identification, suffers from similar limitations, 
though to a slightly lesser degree.  Worldcat reports seventy-two libraries 
that contain print holdings of the journal and 123 that subscribe to the 
electronic version through ProQuest.88  (The JFI is included in a few major 
indexes, including ProQuest and SCOPUS.  This quantum of accessibility 
may be adequate to permit an intrepid researcher to locate materials 
published within JFI.  But it still fails to meet conventional standards of 
research access.89  Indeed, the JFI is not even listed in the Web of Science, a 
large collection of more than 10,000 journals over a wide range of areas.  
Like the AFTE Journal, it is not analyzed in the databases assessing journal 
 
 87. For a discussion of the nature of scientific peer review, see KAYE, BERNSTEIN & 
MNOOKIN, supra note 3, § 7.3.2(b). 
 88. JFI does come in an electronic version, but it is available to libraries only with purchase 
of a large and expensive criminal justice periodicals package, rather than by itself.  This also 
suggests that some of the electronic holders were not specifically choosing the JFI but received it 
along with whatever sources led them to the aggregate database.  Whatever their motivation, 
access is access, and the subscribers to the larger database are providing access to those with access 
to that library.  Some institutions subscribe to both the electronic and the print versions, so the 
total number of libraries providing access to the journal is slightly fewer than adding the two 
numbers would suggest.  However, it appears that Worldcat likely understates electronic access, as 
not every library that lists with Worldcat lists every electronic holding they receive as part of a 
package.  A call to ProQuest confirmed that JFI is not available for subscription alone but is a part 
of the Criminal Justice Periodicals Index.  The ProQuest representative indicated that there are 
more than two hundred subscribers to this database but was unable to provide any more exact 
figures.  Assuming that this number is accurate, it suggests either that some subscribers are not 
members of Worldcat, some subscribers are not listing their electronic access on Worldat, or, as is 
most likely, a combination of both.  Therefore Worldcat’s numbers for electronic access need to 
be taken with a grain of salt.  However, this electronic access subscription number for  JFI can still 
be loosely compared with that of other journals.  There is no reason to believe that libraries would 
be less likely to report this specific holding as opposed to other electronic holdings, so relative 
comparisons are likely meaningful, even if the specific number cannot be trusted. 
 89. It would be unfair to compare JFI to the major publishing venues of a broad scientific or 
social scientific discipline, as pattern identification is a subfield of forensic science.  A more 
reasonable comparison might be, for example, Social Studies of Science, the journal published by an 
academic association (the Society for the Social Study of Science) with many fewer members than 
the IAI, and associated with an extremely small academic subfield (sociology of science).  This 
journal is listed on Worldcat as having 543 subscribers to the print version and 712 to the internet 
version.  Like the JFI numbers, this electronic number likely understates access, probably even 
more substantially than JFI.  Social Studies of Science is available as a package through its publisher, 
Sage.  It is not clear that libraries providing access through Sage, or through the widely available 
JSTOR, would list such access on Worldcat, or that those libraries that provide both print and 
electronic access would include two separate listings in the catalog. 
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impact.90  The JFI also gives its authors “plaques” to mark the fact of 
publication.  While this could be viewed as a nice gesture to recognize an 
author’s efforts and to spur submissions, it is certainly not a practice widely 
seen in other disciplines, and it implicitly treats publication as an unusual 
accomplishment, rather than an expected consequence of engaging in 
research.  Fingerprint Whorld, a quarterly United Kingdom−based journal 
that provides another important source of information to fingerprint 
examiners, is similarly difficult to acquire through libraries. 
Several other publications include pattern-identification-related 
articles, most notably the American Academy of Forensic Sciences’s Journal 
of Forensic Sciences (JFS);91 and Forensic Science International (FSI) 
(published in Europe).  These journals have a significantly greater degree of 
library dissemination and meet more of the typical indicia expected for 
research journals.  They are widely indexed (including in Scopus, Pubmed, 
Medline, Web of Science, and numerous other locations), and they are 
included among the 7300 scientific journals that are assessed for impact by 
the ISI/Web of Knowledge.  However, it is perhaps worth noting that none 
of the top fifty most cited articles in either JFS or FSI relates to pattern 
identification.92  This does not discredit those articles in pattern 
identification that do appear in JFS and FSI.  It illustrates, however, both 
that pattern identification disciplines make up only a small portion of the 
journals’ overall focus, and that none of the journals’ most well-known and 
widely cited articles come from these fields.93  While the JFS is both peer 
reviewed and adequately disseminated to a broad research and practitioner 
 
 90. Impact ratings are an effort to evaluate how much scholarly ‘impact’ specific journals or 
individual articles may have.  Impact ratings, which focus on how often journal articles are cited, 
are imperfect proxies for journal influence and quality.  Nonetheless, it is fair to conclude that an 
unrated journal has a low impact. 
 91. Worldcat has 919 listings for the print version and 301 for the electronic version of 
JFS.  The same caveats about these numbers apply.  Note also that the journal is listed multiple 
times, and these numbers derive from adding the various listings without cross-checking for 
possible duplicate listings.  Note also that many print subscribers likely also have electronic access. 
 92. This was established by searching the ISI/Web of Knowledge by journal title and 
sorting by times cited.  For a broader (but slightly dated) analysis of what topics in forensic science 
are highly cited, see Alan W. Jones, Which Articles and Which Topics in the Forensic Sciences are 
Highly Cited, 45 SCI. & JUST. 175 (2005).  In Jones’s analysis, the topics garnering the most 
citations came from toxicology, criminalistics (almost entirely DNA-related), and pathology.  Id. 
at 178–80.  Whether these disparities are solely the result of population differences across different 
forensic specialties, or also reflect meaningful differences in the quantum of research engagement, 
cannot be determined without further study. 
 93. To be fair, pattern identification fields make up a relatively small portion of the total 
membership of the AAFS.  However, this underscores the value of having a serious, well-
disseminated journal focusing on these areas in particular. 
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community, from the perspective of generating a robust research culture in 
the forensic sciences, one aspect of the AAFS policy is troubling.  
Presenting new research at the AAFS’ annual meeting obligates the 
presenter to give the JFS a right of first refusal (albeit unenforceable) on the 
relevant material.94  While the JFS is a reputable journal, a researcher’s 
publication options should not be restricted because of presentation to the 
forensic science community.  Forensic science would benefit from broader 
dissemination and more frequent publication in high-impact journals that 
are not exclusively geared to the forensic sciences.95 
While we firmly believe that an adequate research culture does not yet 
exist in the pattern and impression evidence disciplines, and is distressingly 
weak throughout many areas of forensic science, we are more interested in 
thinking constructively about how to remedy this situation than in pointing 
fingers and assessing blame.  However, to prevent misunderstanding, it is 
worth making several points explicit.  First, in our view, this lack of a 
research culture is not forensic scientists’ fault.  The two most significant 
causes are a dearth of funding and the fact that prosecutors, investigators, 
and the courts are the primary clients of forensic science.  Until recently, 
very little federal grant money was available for non-DNA forensic science 
research.96  This lack of funding, combined with the general paucity of 
resources in triage-driven, overworked laboratories, made research an 
exceedingly unlikely central priority.  In addition, few practitioners had the 
background skills to develop substantial research programs even if the 
institutional climate had supported it. 
Equally significant, even after Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc.97 emphasized the need for judicial gatekeeping to assure the validity of 
 
 94. See Info for Authors, AM. ACAD. OF FORENSIC SCIS., http://www.aafs.org/info-authors-0 
(last visited Dec. 30, 2010) (“JFS reserves the right of first consideration for publication of any 
work accepted for presentation at an annual meeting of the AAFS, and authors must not submit 
their work elsewhere for a period of six months following the annual meeting at which the work 
was presented.  If a manuscript has not been accepted for publication, or is not under active 
consideration by JFS, at the end of the six-month period, the interest of JFS in the manuscript 
automatically terminates.”). 
 95. Given this rule, it is not surprising that one recent study found that a majority of those 
papers presented at the AAFS that were later published in a peer-reviewed journal were published 
in the JFS.  Silvia Tambuscio et al., From Abstract to Publication: The Fate of Research Presented at 
an Annual Forensic Meeting, 55 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1494, 1496 (2010).  The same study also found 
that, in the annual meeting studied, only 16.4 percent of research presentations led to publication, 
a lower number than the vast majority of presentation-to-publication ratios that have been 
studied.  Id.  This unusually low publication ratio is yet another indicator of the lack of a robust 
research culture. 
 96. Max M. Houck, A Vicious Cycle, 1 FORENSIC SCI. POL’Y & MGMT. 123, 124 (2009). 
 97. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
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expert evidence in court, most judges confronted with pattern 
identification evidence have continued to admit it without restriction.98  If 
courts are not going to insist upon better evidence of validity, if they are 
instead going to continue to permit forensic scientists to reach extremely 
strong conclusions about their own abilities to make identifications, and if 
legal challenges remain both relatively rare and generally unsuccessful, then 
why should the forensic science community consider changing its practices?  
If an examiner is permitted, indeed expected, to express extremely high 
confidence about an individualization, what incentives exist to pursue 
research that would, at best, justify this confidence, and at worst, reveal 
hitherto unrecognized limitations?  The judicial response to these 
identification techniques has therefore been a powerful force both enabling 
and preserving this status quo.  If a few more brave judges had required 
additional evidence to support the claims being made and mandated a 
closer fit between claims made and the research supporting them, the 
forensic science community would have had an extremely strong incentive 
to develop and provide precisely this information.99 
Moreover, most practicing forensic scientists in pattern and impression 
evidence, and in most other forensic disciplines as well, are not actually 
qualified to pursue the necessary research.  Until recently, many 
laboratories did not necessarily require a college degree or any formal 
 
 98. For discussion of these admissibility challenges, see FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 3.  
Some recent cases evincing more skepticism, though generally still admitting the evidence, are 
discussed in KAYE, BERNSTEIN & MNOOKIN, supra note 3, and Mnookin, supra note 4, at 1212–
13, 1241–65.  For an interesting procedural order from one district court judge, see Procedural 
Order: Trace Evidence, No. 1:08-cr-10104-NG (D. Mass. Mar. 8, 2010), available at 
http://www.swgfast.org/Resources/100310-GertnerProceduralOrder.pdf (making clear that in the 
wake of the NAS Report, admissibility of such forensic science evidence “ought not to be 
presumed; that it has to be carefully examined in each case, and tested in the light of the NAS 
concerns, the concerns of Daubert/Kumho case law, and Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence,” and describing pretrial procedures to govern any such challenges). 
 99. See Mnookin, supra note 4; Risinger & Saks, supra note 46, at 65–66; D. Michael 
Risinger, Goodbye To All That or a Fool’s Errand, by One of the Fools: How I Stopped Worrying 
About Court Responses to Handwriting Identification (and “Forensic Science” in General) and Learned 
to Love Misinterpretations of Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 43 TULSA L. REV. 447, 471–75 (2007).  
Some judges have evinced genuine concern about whether some pattern identification passes 
Daubert, and some have restricted the evidence (for example, by permitting descriptions of 
similarities but no conclusion regarding identity, or by prohibiting claims of absolute certainty 
about identity to the exclusion of all others) or occasionally excluded it.  For examples of these 
approaches, see United States. v. Taylor, 663 F. Supp. 2d 1157 (D.N.M. 2009); United States v. 
Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. Mass. 2005); United States v. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d 492 
(E.D. Pa. 2002), vacated, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002); United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 
2d 62 (D. Mass. 1999); Maryland v. Rose, No. K06-0545 (Md. 2007).  However, most 
admissibility challenges have resulted in the admission of the pattern evidence without restriction. 
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science training.100  Even those with a BS in forensic science or some other 
scientific discipline have not typically received significant training in the 
development of research design.  Experience may provide the basis for 
determining what questions to ask, but most pattern identification analysts, 
even with entirely noble intentions, would not be qualified to design or 
develop sophisticated research projects to answer those questions.  We 
neither fault these practitioners for failing to do so, nor do we expect them 
to become primarily focused on research themselves.  We do, however, 
expect them to become more sophisticated in thinking about data and the 
legitimacy of inference.  Expecting most practicing pattern analysts to 
become PhD-level researchers is not realistic, nor is it even a good idea.  If, 
however, practitioners at all levels operated within a research culture, they 
would hone their critical thinking skills and regularly question what basis 
supports their claim to knowledge, both in an individual case, and more 
broadly in a given discipline.  Moreover, while all laboratory personnel 
need not, and indeed should not, be researchers themselves, it would not be 
unrealistic to require certain key personnel—perhaps the lead technical 
worker in a unit, and whoever is authorized to approve standard operating 
procedures—to have some minimum research qualification and experience. 
IV. CREATING A RESEARCH CULTURE: SOME POSSIBLE STEPS 
TOWARD CHANGE 
Culture is sticky.  We fully recognize that cultural change does not 
come easily, and we do not mean to assume naively that the culture of 
pattern identification can be modified with ease.  We do believe that the 
current controversies, the NAS Report, and its aftermath create the 
opportunity for both greater self-reflection and cultural change.  We already 
see a number of positive developments and glimmers of future changes on 
the horizon.101 
 
 100. Peterson et al., supra note 62 (noting that while in the past, “examiners were required 
to have, at a minimum, a high school diploma,” many labs are increasing educational 
requirements).  SWGFAST recommends that new entrants to the field have a minimum of a 
college degree from an accredited institution that included scientific coursework.  See SCIENTIFIC 
WORKING GROUP ON FRICTION RIDGE ANALYSIS, STUDY & TECHNOLOGY, STANDARDS FOR 
MINIMUM QUALIFICATIONS AND TRAINING TO COMPETENCY FOR FRICTION RIDGE EXAMINER 
TRAINEES (2010), available at http://www.swgfast.org/documents/qualifications-
competency/100310_Qualifications_Training_Competency_FR_1.0.pdf. 
 101. For a few examples of interesting developments, see IAI Resolution 2010–18, supra 
note 23 (reflecting a “change [in] the official position of the Association related to Friction Ridge 
Examinations based on advances in the science and scientific research” by no longer prohibiting 
fingerprint examiners from testifying in probabilistic language); the NIST/NIJ working group on 
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In this final Part of the Article, we wish to describe briefly a variety of 
steps that could help to create and institutionalize a research culture within 
the pattern identification sciences.  Is every one of these necessary?  Taken 
together, would they be sufficient?  We are not certain of the answer to 
either of these questions, but we do believe that these suggestions would 
offer meaningful and constructive steps toward positive change. 
Our suggestions also reflect an effort to be realistic about what is 
possible.  For this reason, we are not calling for the courts to transform their 
approach to the admissibility of forensic science.  Many (though not all) of 
us believe that this would be intellectually appropriate and, while 
potentially disruptive in the short run, could also have beneficial cultural 
effects in the medium term.  If, for example, courts insisted on better error-
rate information as a precondition for admissibility, the incentives for its 
production would dramatically increase.  Given that the legal system is the 
major client for forensic science, the requirements courts impose will 
naturally, and perhaps inevitably, influence what quantum and what kinds 
of research are deemed necessary by the community itself.  Indeed, to a 
significant degree, the current state of affairs is the direct product of the 
courts’ nearly nonexistent gatekeeping for these forms of evidence.  Had the 
courts applied Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.102 with an 
intensity in the forensic sciences similar to that seen in, say, the toxic torts 
arena, there is little doubt that the forensic science community would have 
become forceful advocates for whatever research seemed necessary to justify 
admissibility.103  Instead, while some judges have engaged in a certain 
degree of hand wringing, few have actually insisted upon empirical data to 
support forensic examiners’ claims.  Unfortunately, given their responses to 
forensic science challenges over the past few years, the Daubert test’s 
 
Human Factors in Friction Ridge Identification, which has brought together a broad range of 
perspectives and signals a welcome willingness of leaders of the fingerprint community to engage 
with academics ranging from statisticians to law professors; an NSF-funded workshop at 
Northwestern bringing together cognitive psychologists not previously involved in forensic 
inquiries with forensic science practitioners; a procedural order by a district court judge signaling a 
clear willingness to take the issues raised by the NAS Report seriously (detailed in supra note 98); 
NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, COMM. ON SCI., SUBCOMM. ON FORENSIC SCI., 
http://www.forensicscience.gov (last visited Dec. 30, 2010) (describing the creation by the White 
House’s Office of Science and Technology Policy of a Subcommittee on Forensic Science, “to 
assess the practical challenges of implementing recommendations in the 2009 National Research 
Council (NRC) report,” and to advise the White House regarding how to achieve the Report’s 
goals). 
 102. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 103. But see Joseph Sanders, Applying Daubert Inconsistently?: Proof of Individual Causation in 
Toxic Tort and Forensic Cases, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1367 (2010). 
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an and should be done to improve the research culture within 
these fields? 
A. Increased Funding 
                                                                                                                           
fuzziness and flexibility, and the limited appellate review that an ‘abuse-of-
discretion’ standard provides, there is little reason to believe that the 
judiciary will become a force that spurs cultural transformation in th
sic sciences. 
Most of us support the idea of creating an independent entity (such as 
the National Institute of Forensic Science (NIFS) recommended by the 
NAS) that supports and governs the forensic science community, including 
its research activities.  We believe that the major reforms that we and 
others have called for would best be accomplished via a corresponding 
structural change and through the leadership and oversight that a new 
agency, if carefully conceived and implemented, could provide.  But while 
the Senate Judiciary Committee is considering a legislative proposal that 
may create an independent entity within the National Institute of Justice to 
pursue some of what NIFS might have accomplished,104 the po
 a new federal agency seem unmanageable at the moment. 
Given our pessimism regarding the likelihood that the courts will 
be major agents of change, or that a new agency will transform these fields, 
what, then, c
One of the biggest obstacles to forensic science research has been the 
absence of specific federal funding to support it.  The National Science 
Foundation (NSF) has at times funded forensic science research projects,105 
but the NSF focuses on fundamental, rather than applied research.  Some of 
the necessary research within these fields may make important 
methodological and theoretical contributions to broader disciplines, such as 
 
 104. See Int’l Ass’n for Identification, Preliminary Outline of Draft Forensic Reform 
Legislation (May 5, 2010), available at 
http://www.theiai.org/current_affairs/20100505_Draft_Outline_of_Forensic_Reform_Legislation.p
df; see also Letter From Joseph P. Bono, President, Am. Acad. of Forensic Scis., to The Honorable 
Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (June 14, 2010), available at 
http://www.aafs.org/sites/default/files/pdf/AAFSResponseToDraftOutline14June2010.pdf. 
 105. A search of the NSF database reveals at least six funded projects that are squarely 
connected to forensic science: Cognitive Bias and Forensic Science, Jonathan J. Koehler; 
Understanding Jurors Use of Highly Diagnostic Statistical Evidence, Jonathan Koehler; Statistical 
Methods for Fingerprint Image Analysis, Sarat Dass; Why Do Forensic Evaluators With Access to the 
Same Information Come to Different Conclusions When Retained by Opposing Sides in Legal 
Proceedings?, Marcus Boccaccini & Daniel Murie; Jurors’ Evaluations of Forensic Science, William 
C. Thompson; and, Dissertation Research: Taming the Hypervariable Witness: The Introduction, 
Contestation, and Regulation of Forensic DNA Evidence in the American Legal System, John Beatty. 
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onal, albeit still limited, funding for pattern identification 
resea
ue the 
interest of some academic researchers from a variety of disciplines.112 
probability theory, statistics, decision research, and cognitive psychology.  
These kinds of projects might be appropriate for NSF funding.  But much of 
the research critical for the forensic sciences may not make a novel 
methodological or theoretical contribution to other academic fields.  NSF 
does not traditionally fund these more applied forms of inquiry.  Forensic 
science research (apart from DNA profiling) has not received significant 
funding through other sources either.106  For example, until very recently, 
the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) funded very little foundational 
research in the pattern identification sciences.107  This has begun to change 
in the last year, partly as a function of the NAS Report itself.  In 2009, NIJ 
posted a solicitation for funding up to $10 million to applications proposing 
“Fundamental Research to Improve Understanding of the Accuracy, 
Reliability, and Measurement Validity of Forensic Science Disciplines.”108  
Similar solicitations appeared in 2010.109  In addition, the National 
Institute of Standards for Technology (NIST), the Department of Defense, 
the Department of Homeland Security, and the FBI have begun to provide 
some additi
rch.110 
These numbers, while far better than nothing, are a drop in the 
bucket.111  More funding—and some stable and consistent forms of 
funding—is critical for a research culture to take root and flourish.  These 
funding sources sorely need to be independent from law enforcement.  
Solicitations should be as broad in scope and as widely disseminated as 
possible to encourage greater involvement from discipline-based academic 
researchers from fields like physical science, psychology, statistics, and 
computer science.  Funding could help attract creative, cutting-edge work 
from diverse researchers applying the methods and techniques of their 
fields.  While forensic science has not typically been a domain of major 
inquiry for these disciplines, substantial funding will likely piq
                                                                                                                            
 106. See, e.g., Houck, supra note 96, at 124 (showing paltry federal research funding for 
allenge to 
 215, 232 (3d Cir. 2004). 
f this Article have applied for and/or received NIJ funding 
p://www.tswg.gov/subgroups/isf/isf.html. 
forensic science compared with other fields of science and engineering). 
 107. An earlier NIJ solicitation was withdrawn in the wake of an early Daubert ch
fingerprint evidence.  See United States v. Mitchell, 365 F. 3d
 108. http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/sl000878.pdf. 
 109. Several of the coauthors o
under these solicitations and others. 
 110. For example, see the listings at htt
 111. Houck, supra note 96, at 123–24. 
 112. We note that selection of funding recipients must also operate in accordance with the 
values of a research culture.  Nonresearching practitioners should not substantively evaluate the 
research design merits of proposals, except in relation to practical concerns about which their 
42 DRAFT: Do not cite 
 
58:3 Mnookin et al Mnookin Final Proof 1 (1/12/2011 3:41:00 PM) 
                                                                                                                           
B. Improving Forensic Education to Enhance a Research Culture 
In addition to encouraging greater participation from university-based 
researchers from a variety of fields, we strongly believe that forensic science 
would benefit from the emergence of a cohort of individuals with the skills 
and the background to operate both in the academic research community 
and in the world of practitioners.  Currently, in the pattern identification 
field, the number of practicing analysts with a PhD in any discipline is quite 
small indeed.  (This is in stark contrast to a number of other forensic fields, 
including DNA analysis and toxicology, in which a significant number of 
analysts hold PhDs).113 
The majority of forensic practitioners in pattern identification need 
not—and should not—pursue PhDs.  But if some relatively small fraction of 
practitioners were full citizens of both the world of research and the world 
of practice, it would offer enormously beneficial spillover effects.  These 
practitioner-researcher hybrids could wear two hats by being true insiders in 
both communities.  They would be valuable translators, mediators, and 
educators in both domains.  They could both convey to fellow practitioners 
the need for a research-based approach and contribute to ensuring that 
research focuses on areas of genuine and important concern to 
practitioners.114 
 
experience produces expertise.  Practitioners’ views on what research questions are important, and 
why, can absolutely be considered, and if research proposals make unwarranted or naïve 
assumptions about how laboratories operate, that too is relevant to evaluation.  But the academic 
merits of any given research design should be assessed by those with the research qualifications to 
evaluate them.  A recent report revealed a failure of precisely these values at the National 
Institute of Justice, which suggests that it might be a problematic choice to spearhead the forensic 
reform effort.  OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
JUSTICE AUDIT OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE’S PRACTICES FOR AWARDING 
GRANTS AND CONTRACTS IN FISCAL YEARS 2005 THROUGH 2007, at xxiii–xxiv (2009).  While 
we strongly advocate greater funding for fundamental forensic science research, we recognize that 
funding will only produce useful research and strengthen the research culture if it is administered 
and distributed in ways concordant with the values of a research culture.  It is worth noting that 
both institutional capacity concerns and the need for independence from law enforcement 
pressures were reasons that the NAS Report strongly urged the creation of NIFS as an entirely 
new and independent agency.  See NAS REPORT, supra note 8, at 20–21. 
 113. Admittedly (and perhaps ironically), our evidence for both of these claims is anecdotal 
and based on experience rather than the product of careful empirical study. 
 114. Of course, it is theoretically possible that they would be captured by one perspective or 
the other and either lose all touch with practical concerns or become highly credentialed 
spokespeople for the status quo.  We think, however, that precisely because culture is sticky, 
significant exposure and integration into both domains will more likely produce individuals who, 
like those truly bilingual in two languages, can mediate, engage, and translate in both worlds. 
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age in fundamental research.  We see doctoral 
level
evaluation,115 typewriting identification,116 handwriting identification,117 
and fingerprint identification.118  This was Kirk’s deliberate attempt to help 
Given the significant value that would result from encouraging a small 
number of two-hat researcher-practitioners, the government ought to 
consider funding generous competitive grants for highly qualified pattern 
identification practitioners to pursue advanced graduate training in relevant 
disciplines such as physical science, statistics, cognitive psychology, 
computer science, or at a research-focused forensic science program.  These 
grants could, for example, pay half of an analyst’s salary for a period of 
several years to allow the time and financial resources to pursue a PhD.  
highly competitive and well-funded grant opportunities of this kind 
would significantly contribute to the research culture of forensic science. 
Another important step for creating and nurturing a research culture is 
the creation of research-based forensic science programs within academic 
institutions.  While two-hat experts with a PhD in a substantive non-
forensic field along with practical forensic experience can be key mediators 
between a research culture and forensic practice, research programs also 
have a place within forensic science departments.  Academic forensic 
research programs will not generate a research culture in the forensic 
industry, but a small number of excellent research-oriented graduate 
programs in forensic science could help promulgate a research culture and 
could also produce valuable research.  At present, most university-based 
forensic education is far more focused on training future practitioners than 
on training students to eng
 training in forensic science as a supplement to, rather than a substitute 
for, this appropriate focus. 
This is not a new idea.  A few institutions, both past and present, have 
trained doctoral students to conduct significant and foundational research.  
For example, at the University of California, Berkeley, Paul Kirk, and later, 
John Thornton, supervised a number of PhD dissertations on the 
quantitative and theoretical aspects of, among other topics, identification 
                                                                                                                            
 115. Charles R. Kingston, Applications of Probability Theory in Criminalistics, 60 J. AM. STAT. 
rtation, Dissertation, Univ. of Cal., Berkeley); D.A. Stoney, A 
ASS’N 70 (1965); Kwan, Q.Y., “Inference of Identity of Source,” D. Crim. Dissertation, University 
of California, Berkeley, 1977. 
 116. D.A. Crown, A Statistical Evaluation of Typewriting Individuality (1969) 
(unpublished PhD dissertation, Univ. of Cal., Berkeley). 
 117. E. F. Rhodes, The Implications of Kinesthetic Factors in Forensic Handwriting 
Comparisons (1978) (unpublished PhD dissertation, Univ of Cal., Berkeley). 
 118. C.R. Kingston,, Probabilistic Analysis of Partial Fingerprint Patterns, (1964) 
(unpublished PhD disse
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generate fundamental, theoretical research119.  Research from other early 
forensic science programs, such as Michigan State University under Ralph 
Turner, also contributed significantly to the literature, even though such 
programs did not offer doctoral-level training.120  Several strong European 
examples exist as well, both historically and at present.121 
For the most part, however, there has been a disjunction between 
academic research and the forensic laboratory.  Forensic laboratories in the 
United States were, from their outset, framed as arms of law enforcement 
and embedded within a different system of values from academia: 
Without a doubt, the laboratory, as it exists in the United States, is 
an appendage of a quasi-military operation of an enforcement 
agency.  As in the military, the laboratory technician in the quasi-
military operation is subordinate to the administration, which is 
usually not technically trained.  The technician, therefore, does not 
have the freedom of decision nor the opportunity for research that 
would exist if he were a dedicated, well-trained scientist acting as a 
civilian in the proper framework.122 
In some ways, the historical origin story of the forensic laboratory 
explains the divide between research values and forensic practice.  The 
forensic laboratory, from the outset, was seen as bringing cutting edge 
science to enhance older investigative methods (the “needle in the 
haystack” method of human intelligence and shoe leather).123  The 
desirability of a laboratory—touted by the media as a new method of 
catching criminals124—led to the hasty but enthusiastic creation of new 
laboratories.  This perhaps contributed to the inadequate delineation of 
roles between traditional investigators and scientific crime-fighters, and the 
extent of oversight of scientists by sworn officers.  In the meantime, though 
eager for laboratories in principle, police departments did not always 
appreciate what they offered, nor did they understand how to make use of 
 
Quantitative Assessment of Fingerprint Individuality (1985) (unpublished PhD dissertation, 
Univ. of Cal., Berkeley). 
 119. See Paul L. Kirk, The Ontogeny of Criminalistics, 54 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE 
SCI. 235 (1963). 
 120. R.F. Turner, Forensic Science Education—A Perspective, in 13 AM. CHEMICAL SOC’Y 
SYMPOSIUM SERIES 1. 
 121. Of particular note is the forensic science program at UNIL, in Lausanne, Switzerland. 
 122. C. Wilson, Crime Detection Laboratories in the United States, in FORENSIC SCIENCE: 
SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATIONS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 96, 99–100 (J.L. Peterson ed., 1975). 
 123. COLIN WILSON & DAMON WILSON, WRITTEN IN BLOOD 18–19 (2003). 
 124. For an instance of plus ça change plus c’est la même chose, see Max M. Houck, CSI: 
Reality, SCI. AM., July 2006, at 85. 
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them in practice; at the extreme, they were an “incomprehensible”125 
novelty to the nonscientific police: 
Some of these [law enforcement] agencies which are so eager to have 
a laboratory have demonstrated to the author’s satisfaction that they 
don’t even know what a laboratory is for.  Even worse, they have 
little or no conception of the proper use of a laboratory.126 
In its early days, forensic science was thus at some distance from the 
academy, but at the same time, it did not comfortably inhabit the universe 
of law enforcement either.  To some extent, this interstitial set of 
relationships, in which forensic science is neither fish nor fowl, still affects 
both practice and culture. 
Whatever the origin of current relationships, university-based 
academic programs in forensic science can usefully assist the creation of a 
research culture.  We have already described the benefits of encouraging a 
small number of research-based forensic science programs.  A tension often 
exists between disciplinary training—for example, in statistics, or 
psychology—and inherently interdisciplinary training, as forensic science 
education necessarily would be.  But it need not be all or nothing.  Some 
researchers in forensic science should come from disciplines like computer 
science, psychology, chemistry, biology, and statistics.  But there is no 
reason why others might not come from university-based forensic science 
programs able to provide sophisticated training and access to disciplinary 
experts in the relevant subdisciplines.  This dual-track approach to forensic 
research is likely to be more effective than either solely discipline-based 
research, or solely forensic-science-department-based research standing 
alone.  We also recognize that the Forensic Science Educational Program 
Accreditation Commission (FEPAC) has to date accredited thirty 
undergraduate and graduate programs in North America.  More 
importantly, FEPAC requires some degree of research at the graduate level 
for accreditation.127  While we applaud this requirement, we also believe 
 
 125. W. Fong, Criminalistics and the Prosecutor, in FORENSIC SCIENCE: SCIENTIFIC 
INVESTIGATION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 122, at 371 (J.L. Peterson ed., 1975). 
 126. Wilson, supra note 122 at 100.  See also R. PERKINS, ELEMENTS OF POLICE SCIENCE 
39–40 (1942) (“In general, American detectives do not place much weight upon the application 
of scientific principles to the solution of the crimes which they are called upon to investigate.  
There is a reason for this.  They place more stress on their lines of information and their 
acquaintance with criminals and criminal methods. . . . ‘What help,’ they say, ‘will science be in 
catching pick-pockets, bunco men, swindlers, and other types of criminal offenders?’”).  Bunco is 
“[a] swindle perpetrated by means of card-sharping or some form of confidence trick,” from “banca, 
a card-game similar to monte.”  2 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 654 (2d ed. 1989). 
 127. FEPAC states: 
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that carefully delineated accreditation requirements can feed a research 
culture but cannot necessarily create one. 
Another, perhaps more innovative, approach to integrating practical 
aspects into university programs is the development and implementation of 
a clinical forensic instruction program within the university system.  David 
Stoney has previously drawn parallels between the current state of 
educational practices in modern forensic science and the state of medical 
practice education between 1870 and 1926.128  Stoney showed how 
institutions such as Johns Hopkins Medical School significantly benefited 
from a new innovation: the teaching hospital.  Students cared for patients 
and discussed cases with their clinical instructors.  Students learned by 
trying it for themselves, engaging in actual practice, rather than just 
watching instructors or listening to lectures.  Critical thinking and concrete 
problem-solving ability was valued over memorization.  The teaching 
hospital became a center of instruction, learning, and research.  The 
teaching hospital model is similar to the atelier method of art instruction129 
and both approaches have something significant to recommend to forensic 
science. 
“Teaching forensic laboratories” would not be difficult to imagine 
within a university system.  These laboratories could take cases from both 
the prosecution and defense.  They could do initial analysis or perhaps 
could be available to reanalyze evidence.  They would benefit from a lack of 
institutional attachment to law enforcement or structural partiality to one 
 
Each student is required to complete an independent research project.  The 
research project shall culminate in a thesis, or written report of publishable quality.  The 
academic program must have written guidelines for the format of the thesis or report.  In 
addition, the results of the work shall be presented orally in a public forum for evaluation 
by a committee. 
The research shall be conducted in an environment conducive to research and 
scholarly inquiry, and shall provide the opportunity for faculty and students to contribute 
to the knowledge base of forensic science, including research directed at improving the 
practice of forensic science. 
A committee of at least three individuals to include faculty, forensic practitioners 
and others with specialized knowledge will evaluate the project.  At least one member of 
the committee must be external to the department housing the academic program. 
FORENSIC SCI. EDUC. PROGRAMS ACCREDITATION COMM’N, AM. ACAD. OF FORENSIC SCIS., 
ACCREDITATION STANDARDS § 5.3.2.4 (2010). 
 128. See David A. Stoney, A Medical Model for Criminalistics Education, 33 J. FORENSIC SCI. 
1086 (1988). 
 129. This method of art instruction takes its name from the French word for “artist’s studio.”  
An artist trains a small number of students in the skills and techniques associated with creating 
some form of representational art, starting with more basic forms and progressing through more 
complex methods.  See R. LACK, THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CLASSICAL REALISM, ON THE 
TRAINING OF PAINTERS: WITH NOTES ON THE ATELIER PROGRAM (1969). 
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adversarial side.130  Students, working under the care and instruction of 
trained practitioners, could learn from real-world cases and face a realistic 
but challenging array of circumstances.  These teaching laboratories could 
also provide a place for investigating and assessing emerging research and 
techniques before their general dissemination to state and local forensic 
laboratories.  These teaching laboratories could also be a useful site for 
conducting research on validation, as well as on bias and other human 
factors. 
Teaching laboratories could also relieve traditional forensic science 
laboratories of much of the burden of training.  Students emerging from a 
clinical instruction program would accumulate significantly more useful 
training and experience than current novice applicants for jobs in crime 
laboratories.  Under the current system, successful applicants undergo 
lengthy training programs, some as long as one to three years.  Inevitably, 
some trainees are poorly suited for the positions, or they discover that the 
profession is not for them.  The costs of this wash out are high, since several 
years and tens of thousands of dollars have often been invested in the 
process before the mismatch between trainee and profession becomes 
clear.131  A clinical forensic instruction laboratory would reduce this 
inefficient hiring and training practice.  Moreover, trainees who had gained 
experience through a training laboratory model might gain broader 
exposure to a richer variety of real-world circumstances and possibly even 
enhanced critical thinking abilities from their hands-on experiences. 
C. Improving the Culture of Forensic Science Journals 
To improve the research culture of the pattern identification sciences, 
some changes to the current approach to journals and publications are 
sorely needed.  First, all forensic science journals should insist upon a full-
fledged commitment to research norms.  Publication in any journal that is 
not indexed by at least some of the major indexing services should, in a 
sense, not even count as publication.  Peer review should be serious, blind, 
 
 130. Indeed, perhaps a procedure could be developed in which a party could, in certain 
circumstances, request that a court require such an impartial laboratory to analyze disputed 
evidence. 
 131. In a case study involving one laboratory, poorly designed hiring procedures led to 
attrition costs estimated at roughly $850,000, and estimated lost productivity of nearly $5 million 
(because of the loss of sixteen employees).  These cost estimates did not include the costs 
associated with recruiting, selection, or training.  See W. Mark Dale & Wendy B. Becker, A Case 
Study of Forensic Scientist Turnover, FORENSIC SCI. COMM. (July 2004), 
http://www2.fbi.gov/hq/lab/fsc/backissu/july2004/research/2004_03_research04.htm. 
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and carried out by individuals well qualified to assess the research merits of 
any given article.  While non-research-oriented practitioners can play a 
valuable role in peer review as well, evaluations by those with the necessary 
qualification to assess the merits and execution of any given study should 
dominate the criteria for acceptance.  It should also go without saying that 
concerns about whether a given set of findings comports with practitioners’ 
(or researchers’) expectations and desires should not affect publishing 
decisions.  To be sure, some findings are more interesting or surprising than 
others, and this may legitimately affect evaluations of a given article.  But 
the fact that a research result might alienate or irritate practitioners ought 
not to affect publication decisions. 
The pattern identification disciplines would also benefit from a 
genuine flagship journal that crosses between forensic science itself and 
broader research paradigms.  Perhaps the JFS, which is already a legitimate 
and respected research vehicle, can play this role.  However, the pattern 
disciplines make up a small part of JFS publications, and the JFS does not 
especially focus on the intersections of forensic science with other 
disciplines.  Whether a new flagship journal focusing on pattern evidence 
would be feasible is a difficult question.  In an ideal world, such a journal 
would link in equal quantities to other forensic sciences and also to other 
academic fields, like statistics, cognitive psychology, and electrical and 
computer engineering.  How to create such a flagship journal is not obvious, 
but one place to start would be with a high-powered and interdisciplinary 
editorial board that reaches broadly into ancillary disciplines as well as 
including leading members of the forensic science research community. 
D. Using Scientific Standards to Guide Casework 
Another set of suggestions focuses on efforts to use conventional 
scientific standards to guide casework.  One key example is “sequential 
unmasking.”132  Analysts should have access to all the domain-relevant 
information they need to conduct their inquiry, but they should be shielded 
from domain-irrelevant matters unless or until those matters affect the 
analysis.  A fingerprint examiner, for example, likely does need to know the 
surface from which a print was lifted.  A fingerprint examiner does not need 
to know, however, about the suspect’s confession or his three prior 
 
 132. See Dan E. Krane et al., Sequential Unmasking: A Means of Minimizing Observer Effects in 
Forensic DNA Interpretation, 53 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1006 (2008).  The basic idea of sequential 
unmasking (without the use of that label) was set out in Risinger et al., supra note 49, at 50–51. 
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convictions for similar crimes.  A document examiner cannot escape seeing 
the content of the document being analyzed; however, she need not be told 
broader aspects of the prosecution’s theory of the case. 
Sequential unmasking creates protocols that protect examiners from 
these kinds of biasing information.133  From a research culture perspective, 
sequential unmasking offers two significant benefits.  First, it protects 
examiners from materials and knowledge that might otherwise have a 
biasing effect on their evaluation.134  The enormous literature on bias and 
cognition suggests the value of providing such a shield.135 
Sequential unmasking has another benefit as well.  Because it requires 
practitioners to think carefully about what information is domain-relevant 
and what is not, and why, sequential unmasking also encourages precisely 
the kind of careful attention to the relationship between evidence and 
warrant that a research culture demands.  The very process of thinking hard 
and justifying the inclusion or exclusion of certain kinds of information 
from an examiner’s purview will be a meaningful step toward the 
instantiation of a research culture. 
Implementing blind proficiency tests in the stream of casework would 
be another way to make casework better comport with scientific principles 
for the production of knowledge.  Controlled, double-blind studies are the 
gold standard in medicine.136  In a double-blind study, practitioners and 
patients do know that they are participating in a research study, but their 
potential interpretive biases and expectation effects are reduced because 
they do not know if they are receiving the medication being tested or a 
placebo.  Similarly, proficiency test subjects (and those administering the 
test) ideally ought not to know when they are pursuing ordinary casework 
and when they are undergoing a proficiency test. 
 
 133. Krane et al., supra note 132.  To be sure, sequential unmasking may also increase costs 
by requiring an additional layer of personnel to assess what information is domain-relevant and to 
ensure that non-domain-relevant information is stripped from the materials the examiner 
receives.  But given the strong evidence in other fields of the biasing effects of context 
information, the onus arguably ought to be on the forensic practitioner community to show why 
these costs are not worth incurring. 
 134. Dror & Rosenthal, supra note 32, at 902–03; Dror & Charlton, supra note 32, at 612; 
Risinger et al., supra note 49, at 45.  Note that domain-relevant information may also generate 
bias, for example, when a DNA examiner looks at a mixture already knowing the suspect’s profile. 
 135. For an overview of some of this literature and its highlights, see generally Risinger et 
al., supra note 49. 
 136. See, e.g., John Concato, et al., Randomized, Controlled Trials, Observational Studies, and 
the Hierarchy of Research Designs, 342 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 1887 (2000); Henry Sacks et al., 
Randomized Versus Historical Controls for Clinical Trials, 72 AM. J. MED. 233 (1982). 
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Improving documentation practices in order to increase transparency 
is another step to incorporate scientific standards.  While the particular 
degree of documentation may appropriately vary with the complexity of the 
comparison, documentation should be both thorough and transparent.  If a 
fingerprint examiner, for example, finds additional minutiae on a latent 
print after beginning the comparison process, this back-and-forth reasoning 
should be clearly noted.  Similarly, an examiner should indicate the degree 
of confidence (for example, high, medium, low) in the existence of 
minutiae or striations or handwriting features in the disputed exemplar in 
advance of undertaking any comparison.  While careful documentation is 
no substitute for the empirical research needed to establish the power and 
the limits of various techniques, it can usefully clarify an examiner’s 
reasoning process and the basis for any conclusions, and may offer some 
protections from the potential biasing effect of the comparison process.137 
E.  Enhancing the “Science” in the Scientific Working Groups (SWGs) 
Guidelines and standards for forensic practice in a great many forensic 
disciplines are developed and recommended by entities known as Scientific 
Working Groups (SWGs), funded by the Department of Justice.  Most of 
these working groups, which have emerged over the past twenty years, 
operate under the auspices of the FBI laboratory.  They were designed to 
develop best practices, create appropriate technical standards, and improve 
communications both within and among various forensic disciplines.138  
Scientific Working Groups exist for firearms and toolmarks (SWGGUN), 
friction ridge analysis study and technology (SWGFAST), imaging 
technology (SWGIT), DNA (SWGDAM), shoeprint and tire tread 
evidence (SWGTREAD), drug analysis (SWGDRUG), as well as for a 
number of other forensic disciplines.  These organizations have provided 
important venues for consensus building, policy development, and 
knowledge dissemination. 
However, despite the scientific label in the name of the working 
groups, SWGs have a rather tenuous relationship with research science.  
 
 137. Glenn Langenburg & Christophe Champod, The GYRO System—A Recommended 
Approach to More Transparent Documentation (July 9, 2010) (draft), available at 
http://projects.nfstc.org/ipes/presentations/Langenburg_GYRO-System.pdf.  See generally, 
Interpretation Chapter, in NIST/NIJ Working Group Report (forthcoming 2011). 
 138. For basic information about the SWGs, see Scientific Working Groups, FED. BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/swgs (last visited Dec. 30, 2010).  Several 
SWGs operate from locations other than the FBI.  SWGRUG operates out of the DEA, and 
SWGSTAIN operates out of the Midwest Forensic Resource Center. 
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Indeed, some of them previously went by other names.  For example, 
SWGDAM, the FBI’s DNA advisory group, used to be known as TWGDM, 
the technical working group on DNA analysis and methods. 
What should a scientific working group worthy of the name look like?  
Certainly a legitimate scientific working group would necessarily include 
practitioners who could inform the group about best and current practices 
in the discipline as well as practical constraints that operate within that 
area.  These participants would be critical to the proper grounding and 
anchoring of a forensic science working group.  However, these 
nonresearcher practitioners should make up only a minority of the group’s 
total members.  The major focus of SWGs should be to ensure that all 
recommendations for methods and practices are grounded in research and 
validated.  When insufficient research exists, SWGs should determine what 
research is most critical to assess standards or best practices.  Given these 
purposes, the bulk of the membership in scientific working groups should be 
scientists who have a relevant research background.  Indeed, some members 
should be scientists outside the forensic discipline of the SWG and some 
should come from outside of forensic science entirely.  These members will 
offer fresh perspectives and help avoid the danger of excessive buy-in to 
current practices simply because they are both known and familiar.  The 
workings of the SWG would thus be driven by scientists and scientific 
considerations along with thoughtful input from the practitioners who 
would contribute to the formulation and help to operationalize the SWG’s 
recommendations.  If SWGs were organized in this fashion, they would help 
create and perpetuate a research culture, and ensure that forensic science 
fields use recommended methods and processes based on scientific 
principles and informed by scientific research. 
While the membership of the current SWGs varies, most of them are 
substantially more practitioner-led than what we have just described.  The 
working group on friction ridge analysis study and technology 
(SWGFAST), for example, is one of the stronger SWGs.  Several current 
members have serious and significant research interests.  But they form only 
a small minority of the total membership.  On the one hand, given the 
paucity of research opportunities and the structure of forensic science, this 
limited proportion of research-oriented members is only to be expected.  
But in a research culture one would expect—and insist—that the standard-
setting, guideline-creating, policy body for any given field be structured so 
as to ensure that its decisions are based upon data and research, not simply 
the result of a two-thirds vote from a practitioner-dominated working 
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group.139  To be sure, practitioner-led SWGs may often reach appropriate, 
thoughtful, and perhaps even research-based conclusions, but they also risk 
being guided by and influenced by populist practitioner pressures.  To be 
worthy of their name, SWGs need to make certain that scientific findings 
and an appreciation for a research culture drive decisions. 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) may take 
over the SWGs in the near future; we hope that such a move will 
incorporate a major restructuring of how the SWGs operate.  If such a move 
is merely a change in their funding source from the DOJ to NIST without 
significant structural changes, SWGs may be useful as sounding boards for 
leading practitioners, but they will continue to have little to do with a 
research culture. 
F. Access to Data 
Another needed dimension for a robust research culture is access to 
data and test subjects.  Participation in the research enterprise must 
obviously be balanced against a laboratory’s other needs, and a laboratory 
may be unable to participate in every research project asked of it.  However, 
access to data—exemplars and databases—should not be limited to 
practitioners at a given laboratory.  With appropriate precautions for 
protecting confidentiality and the necessary input of Institutional Review 
Boards, forensic laboratories, as well as institutions like the FBI and state 
and federal criminal justice authorities, should make data available to 
qualified researchers to the maximum extent possible.140 
To create incentives for providing this access, participating as research 
subjects ought to become an accreditation requirement for forensic labs.  
Just as many law schools have implemented pro bono requirements for 
students, the American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors Laboratory 
Accreditation Board (ASCLD-LAB) should require that every laboratory 
devote a given number of hours to participation in research.  The details of 
how to structure such a requirement could be worked out in a variety of 
 
 139. For SWGFAST’s bylaws, as an example, see Bylaws, SCIENTIFIC WORKING GROUP ON 
FRICTION RIDGE ANALYSIS, STUDY & TECH. (Sept. 15, 2009), 
http://www.swgfast.org/Resources/Bylaws_3.2-Corrected.pdf. 
 140. This has been an ongoing issue in DNA analysis as well.  For example, researchers have 
unsuccessfully endeavored to access anonymized DNA profiles from the United States National 
DNA Index system, controlled by the FBI.  See D. E. Krane et al., Time for DNA Disclosure, 326 
SCIENCE 1631 (2009).  Yet, some researchers have had access to databases for other countries.  See 
David H. Kaye, Trawling DNA Databases for Partial Matches: What Is the FBI Afraid of?, 19 
CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 145, 161–65 (2009). 
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ways.  Perhaps every employee should be allowed a modest number of paid 
work hours for participation as a “test subject” in the research study of her 
choice; or perhaps laboratories should create more structured systems for 
participation.  Whatever the details, the point is to create workable 
mechanisms to encourage research participation by sometimes wary 
laboratories.  To be clear, laboratories themselves would not necessarily 
spearhead these research projects.  Rather, analysts would be made available 
as test subjects, consulting on the feasibility of certain research endeavors, 
providing feedback on what research questions would have practical payoff 
for laboratories, and creating partnerships with researchers both from 
within and from outside the forensic sciences. 
G. Managing the Tension Between an Adversarial Culture and a 
Research Culture 
The fact that the pattern identification fields and other forensic 
sciences are embedded within the legal system has made it difficult for a 
research culture to flourish.  Numerous commentators (and the NAS 
Report) have criticized the institutional connections between the police, 
the prosecutors, and the crime laboratories.  Indeed, the NAS Report, like 
some scholarship that preceded it, explicitly calls for making crime 
laboratories independent of these other domains.141 
Clearly structural risks of both bias and partisanship stem from the 
institutional location of crime laboratories.  Several scandals have 
illustrated the dangers raised by forensic scientists who may feel pressured to 
provide prosecutors with what they are seeking.142  Partisanship is a serious 
and long-recognized danger for all kinds of expert witnesses,143 and 
operating as part of the institutional apparatus of law enforcement may 
make practitioners unconsciously partisan.144  Additionally, the strong 
institutional links to police investigators may compromise efforts to protect 
examiners from access to unnecessary, and potentially biasing, contextual 
 
 141. NAS REPORT, supra note 8, at 183–84; Paul C. Giannelli, The Abuse of Scientific 
Evidence in Criminal Cases: The Need for Independent Crime Laboratories, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 
439, 470–73 (1997); Roger Koppl, How to Improve Forensic Science, 20 EUR. J. L. & ECON. 255, 
258 (2005). 
 142. See, e.g., Locke & Neff, supra note 5. 
 143. See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1113; Jennifer L. 
Mnookin, Expert Evidence, Partisanship, and Epistemic Competence, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 1009 
(2008). 
 144. David E. Bernstein, Expert Witnesses, Adversarial Bias, and the (Partial) Failure of the 
Daubert Revolution, 93 IOWA L. REV. 451, 456 (2008). 
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information about the case.  To be sure, there may also be benefits from the 
current institutional location, ranging from possible efficiency gains from 
police authority over forensic science, to motivational gains for forensic 
scientists who may benefit psychologically from being part of law 
enforcement.  And of course, any institutional location has its own set of 
costs and benefits that would need to be compared to the current set.145 
Most, but not all, of us believe that institutional separation of 
laboratories from the law enforcement apparatus would be tremendously 
beneficial for reducing the dangers of partisanship and fostering a research 
culture.  However, most, but not all, of us also believe that even if this is 
indeed a worthy and highly desirable goal, it is also unlikely to be realized in 
the near future.  One small but constructive step toward creating at least a 
modicum of psychological distance between laboratories and the implicit 
(or, sometimes explicit) pressures from law enforcement would be a 
requirement that all laboratories perform a certain quantity of defense-side 
work, enabling analysts to gain experience in a different role vis-à-vis the 
adversary system.146 
However, the problematic dynamics of adverarialism and their 
potentially pathological effects on a research culture go beyond the 
sometimes-too-cozy prosecutor-police-forensic-science relationship.  The 
dynamics of the courtroom and of the adversarial process itself can create 
significant incentives for analysts to resist the collection of information or 
the production of data that might assist their adversary or weaken their own 
credibility.  If any documented error is likely to haunt an examiner on every 
subsequent cross-examination, there may be little motivation to identify or 
audit mistakes.  If difficult proficiency tests would potentially provide 
extensive fodder for defense attorneys, why would examiners risk shooting 
themselves (or the prosecutors with whom they work) in the foot by 
attempting to determine the limits to their own abilities? 
We do not have any simple fixes for this set of structural difficulties, 
but we offer two suggestions.  First, we would suggest that laboratories 
 
 145. See Dror, supra note 25, at 101–02. 
 146. At present, not only do most state laboratories not regularly conduct testing for the 
defense, but policies about whether state laboratory workers can consult for the defense in other 
jurisdictions vary.  One recent controversy in Minnesota illustrates the depth of adversarial norms.  
When a medical examiner consulted for the defense in a case in another county, the prosecutor in 
her home county complained to her boss, causing the medical examiner to fear for her job.  While 
the prosecutor later apologized and was reprimanded for his behavior, the incident captures the 
conceptual partisanship frequently seen in the field—the notion that state forensic science 
workers are tied to the prosecution.  See Joy Powell, Dakota County Prosecutor Reprimanded by State 
Board, MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL STAR TRIBUNE, May 19, 2009. 
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consider extending something akin to Brady duties to examiners 
themselves.  Under Brady v. Maryland,147 prosecutors have an ethical duty 
to report exculpatory evidence to defense attorneys.  Brady has already been 
extended to information in the possession of agents of the prosecution such 
as the police,148 and there is no reason that this should not apply to forensic 
scientists.  While a forensic scientist may have a legal duty to disclose 
exculpatory evidence to a prosecutor, courts have not held Brady duties to 
extend directly from the forensic scientist or police to the defense.  What 
would be the consequences of an ethical obligation of forensic scientists to 
disclose directly to the defense any exculpatory findings or any inter-
laboratory disagreement regarding conclusion or interpretation?  Perhaps 
more robust reporting requirements, in which an analyst routinely discloses 
any interpretive disagreement within her laboratory report, would be a 
simpler means to achieve a similar goal.  The purpose of either a disclosure 
requirement or enhanced reporting norms is in part to increase the degree 
of perceived and subjectively felt independence from law enforcement, 
even if no formal institutional realignment takes place.  At a minimum, a 
research culture should mean clear and robust expectations about 
transparency and documentation: Reports should carefully detail steps 
taken, findings reached, and internal disagreement (if any) about the results 
or the interpretation. 
A second idea worth considering is whether there ought to be a 
protective evidentiary privilege that attaches to self-critical investigation 
and analysis in at least some circumstances.  This presents an extremely 
difficult question of balancing competing goals.  Creating a privilege that 
protects a laboratory from having to disclose what it learns through the 
investigation of an error may lead to much better error investigation that 
may in turn reduce future errors.  But in the particular case, this benefit 
would come at the expense of keeping highly relevant, potentially 
exculpatory material from defendants.  Although some courts have 
recognized a self-critical analysis privilege in the medical peer review 
context (which faces structurally similar issues, though typically in a civil 
rather than criminal setting), it is quite unlikely that courts would extend it 
to the criminal domain, in significant part because of the criminal 
defendant’s constitutional due process right to exculpatory information. 
Nonetheless, it may be worth considering whether there are any 
feasible mechanisms through which defendants’ legitimate (and, in some 
 
 147. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
 148. See, e.g., Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995). 
56 DRAFT: Do not cite 
 
58:3 Mnookin et al Mnookin Final Proof 1 (1/12/2011 3:41:00 PM) 
                                                                                                                           
instances, constitutionally mandated) need for information could 
appropriately be balanced against efforts to promote self-analysis and 
research.  It is difficult to imagine a privilege that would protect a 
laboratory from the disclosure of an error in actual casework.  But what if a 
laboratory wanted to test its examiners’ proficiency on difficult and close 
nonmatches?  Should it be able to protect itself from having to report their 
results?  Should a researcher be protected from having to identify the 
laboratories that participated in a study?  Or which individuals achieved 
what results?  To what extent should some kind of research privilege protect 
both researchers and laboratories in order to remove one major impediment 
to cooperation, when the results do not directly implicate any particular 
case or defendant? 
Finally, we believe the fear that admitting imperfections might 
significantly harm jurors’ understanding and appreciation of the pattern 
identification sciences may be largely chimerical.  It is not clear that jurors 
would substantially discount conclusions from forensic science examiners 
even if they were presented with information quantifying error rates greater 
than zero; even if they knew that this particular examiner had made an 
occasional mistake on proficiency tests; and even if they knew that a so-
called match did not necessarily mean that every other human being (or 
bullet, or tool) in the world could be excluded as a potential source.  
Certainly mitochondrial DNA evidence—which cannot ever, standing 
alone, individualize because maternal relatives share the same 
mitochondrial DNA—can significantly contribute to a successful 
prosecution.  Particularly in those cases in which the pattern identification 
evidence was combined with other probative evidence suggesting guilt, it is 
hardly obvious that these caveats with regard to the pattern identification 
evidence would have any significant impact on juror reasoning.149  And in 
 
 149. This is, of course, an empirical question.  We can, however, make some guesses from 
the literature on how jurors weigh expert testimony.  See, e.g., Valerie P. Hans et al., Science in the 
Jury Box: Jurors’ Comprehension of Mitochondrial DNA Evidence, LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
(forthcoming 2010); David H. Kaye et al., Statistics in the Jury Box: How Jurors Respond to 
Mitochondrial DNA Probabilities, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 797 (2007); Jonathan J. Koehler et 
al., The Random Match Probability in DNA Evidence: Irrelevant and Prejudicial?, 35 JURIMETRICS 
201 (1995); Dawn McQuiston-Surrett & Michael J. Saks, Communicating Opinion Evidence in the 
Forensic Identification Sciences: Accuracy and Impact, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1159 (2008); Dawn 
McQuiston-Surrett & Michael J. Saks, The Testimony of Forensic Identification Science: What Expert 
Witnesses Say and What Factfinders Hear, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 436 (2009); Dale A. Nance & 
Scott B. Morris, An Empirical Assessment of Presentation Formats for Trace Evidence With a Relatively 
Large and Quantifiable Random Match Probability, 42 JURIMETRICS J. 403 (2002); Dale A. Nance & 
Scott B. Morris, Juror Understanding of DNA Evidence: An Empirical Assessment of Presentation 
Formats for Trace Evidence With a Relatively Small Random-Match Probability, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 
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those rare cases where the pattern identification evidence stands largely 
alone, perhaps a greater degree of skepticism would be epistemologically 
warranted. 
CONCLUSION 
Our purpose in writing this Article has been to bring together a group 
of practitioners and academics who have all spent time thinking hard about 
forensic science, to see if we could find consensus about how to improve the 
field.  Although many of us inhabit overlapping intellectual and 
professional circles, we did not all know each other beforehand, and we 
come from a variety of different intellectual traditions and locations.  This 
project therefore began as something of an experiment.  Its origin was at a 
conference held at UCLA in February 2009, on the one-year anniversary of 
the release of the NAS Report.  After the public symposium, sponsored by 
the UCLA School of Law’s Program on Understanding Law, Science, and 
Evidence (PULSE), this group of coauthors gathered for an intense, day-
long brainstorming session. 
As we discussed, outlined, and argued, we discovered that our views 
had more in common than one might have expected.150  Indeed, we found 
that in many important respects, our views of what forensic science most 
needed significantly converged. 
We all believe that the NAS Report got far more right than it got 
wrong.  We all believe that many forms of forensic science today stand on 
an insufficiently developed empirical research foundation.  We all believe 
that forensic science does not yet have a well-developed research culture.  
These disciplines, in our view, need to increase their commitment to 
empirical evidence as the basis for their claims.  Sound research, rather 
than experience and training, must become the central method by which 
assertions are justified.  While there can indeed be a legitimate role for 
experience-based claims of knowledge, such claims need to be both put 
forward with appropriate epistemic modesty and assessed through feedback 
mechanisms.  The answer to the question “How well can you do what you 
 
395 (2005); Jason Schklar & Shari Seidman Diamond, Juror Reactions to DNA Evidence: Errors 
and Expectancies, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 159 (1999); Jonathan J. Koehler, If the Shoe Fits They 
Might Acquit: The Perceived Value of Shoeprint Testimony (Sept. 13, 2010) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with UCLA Law Review). 
 150. Jerry Kang also participated in our day-long session and used MindManager to “map” 
our conversation in real time.  Both our brainstorming process and the drafting of this Article 
were greatly assisted by his tremendous mind-mapping skill. 
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say you can do?” is more properly answered by blind proficiency tests than 
by reference to experience or training.  The forensic sciences need to 
increase their commitment to transparency along a variety of dimensions—
from increasing the documentation provided in complex cases; to more 
readily sharing data with researchers; to increasing access to protocols and 
standard procedures; to acknowledging and learning from errors.  In 
addition, the pattern and impression fields, as well as other forms of forensic 
science, need to develop and sustain an ongoing critical and reflective 
stance, in which yesterday’s truths can be revisited tomorrow. 
We have offered a number of suggestions for ways to develop and 
improve a research culture in these fields, but we are frankly more confident 
in our diagnosis than in our specific suggestions for possible cures.  We are, 
however, unanimous in hoping and believing that this is a rather special 
historical moment, a time when cultural change in forensic science—even 
perhaps, a genuine “paradigm shift”151—is possible.  Perhaps, just perhaps, 
the very fact of our writing this Article together provides a small piece of 
evidence that this change has already begun. 
 
 151. Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Coming Paradigm Shift in Forensic 
Identification Science 309 SCIENCE 892, 895 (“[W]e envision a paradigm shift in the traditional 
forensic identification sciences in which untested assumptions and semi-informed guesswork are 
replaced by a sound scientific foundation and justifiable protocols.”).  For the classic discussion of 
paradigm shifts in science, see THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 
(2d ed. 1970). 
